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ABSTRACT 
This thesis, entitled “Skilled Emigration and the Sending State: Using 
Engineering as a Case Study in Egypt,” was completed by Marise Habib, under the 
supervision of Dr. Ray Jureidini, at the American University in Cairo. The thesis 
explores the impact of skilled emigration on Egypt by looking into the migration 
intentions of the Class of 2010 from the Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University. 
Skilled emigration is often considered to be entirely detrimental to sending states as 
the loss of highly trained minds is viewed independently and not considered as part of 
a broader movement of persons and capital.  
Student intentions in this study were gauged using a survey distributed to 
students online and on their campus, which posed questions regarding desires to work 
abroad, emigrate, reasons behind these intentions, intent to remit and intent to return. 
Data gathered was then analyzed in light of existing literature on skilled emigration to 
see how the migration intentions of the class studied will affect Egypt in terms of 
direct loss if the student is considered an investment, direct gains through remittances 
and indirect gains stemming largely from return migration. The thesis then looks at 
existing and recommended policies as a way to guide the discussion on moving 
forward. It concludes by reiterating that the gains from emigration cannot be 
harnessed simply retroactively, but policies and discussions on emigration must be 
met with an understanding that systemic and societal education and change, whether 
infrastructural, educational or cultural, are necessary to ensure that sending states do 
not wind up solely losing in the migration equation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 “Egyptians have the reputation of preferring their own 
soil. Few ever leave except to study or travel; and they 
always return … Egyptians do not emigrate” – Wendell 
Cleland1 
 
Wendell Cleland arrived at this conclusion following his research in 1936, but 
much has changed in this assertion over the course of the past seven decades. While 
the attachment to the homeland insinuated in his statement is still very evident in 
Egyptian society today, the political, social and economic changes that have occurred 
in the country in the past half century have expanded the reasons behind Egyptian 
departure beyond studies and travels. The present study will address the implications 
of skilled emigration on Egypt on domestic labor market, costs and social and human 
capital acquisition and does so by incorporating data gathered from an original survey 
of students from Cairo University's Faculty of Engineering's graduating class, gauging 
their migration intentions and reasons driving these, within existing scholarship on 
skilled emigration and the sending state. Following an exploration of these effects, 
primarily as they pertain to the country economically, the author will discuss policies 
that aim to maximize the benefits to Egypt of what can initially be construed as 
simple losses of bodies and minds. 
Traditionally, discourse on migration deals with sending and receiving states 
as separate entities linking them mainly in terms of the migrants themselves, while 
still upholding state sovereignty as the dichotomy to distinguish between states. The 
nature of migration, however, stands in clear defiance of such a dichotomy 
underscoring the “more fluid, transnational (although not deterritorialized) existence 
                                                 
1 Wendell Cleland, The Population Problem in Egypt: A Study of Population Trends and Conditions in 
Modern Egypt (Lancaster, PA: Science Press Printing Company, 1936). 
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that characterizes many of today’s migrants”2. The maintenance of strong ties by the 
migrant to their home country generates the need to observe the effect of emigration 
on development in the sending state. While development as a term is clearly 
problematic in itself, here it will be discussed in terms of economic stimulus. 
Following a description of the methods used in this study to determine the 
migration intentions of the sample population of university students, Chapter 1 will 
introduce the historical migration context within which migration policies in Egypt 
have emerged and the existing legal framework that governs migration for Egyptians 
today. Chapter 2 then begins with an analysis of the traditional patterns of migration 
for Egyptians, followed by an introduction of the sample population, their intended 
destinations and their reasons for emigrating. These contextual introductions will pave 
the way for Chapter 3 in which skilled migration is addressed in terms of its actual 
costs for the sending state, and its effect on the distribution of labor. The survey 
sample’s intentions to emigrate are analyzed here in light of existing data on 
unemployment in the field of engineering in Egypt to determine whether recent 
graduates have a realistic grasp on market provision of positions for new entrants. 
Chapter 4 follows with a discussion of the potential gains for the sending state 
stemming from emigration, by first discussing the direct monetary gains deriving 
from monies remitted by the diaspora, and then considering the ripple benefits for the 
market of return migration. Finally, Chapter 5 will provide a general discussion of 
existing policies addressing emigration from Egypt, and discuss a few policies that 
Egypt could adopt, which it has considered in some cases, to minimize potential loss 
from the skilled emigration discussed in this thesis. 
                                                 
2 Laurie Brand, "Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa," 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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While it appears counter intuitive to consider the emigration of a state’s skilled 
minds in a positive light, this thesis aims to analyze how, despite the immediate loss 
of educated minds to foreign states, a sending country, namely Egypt in this instance, 
can benefit from skilled emigration in the short-run as a method of alleviating 
domestic unemployment problems until better regulating policies are put in place for 
the long-run that can enhance the use of skilled minds to better meet the demands of 
the domestic labor market.  
1.1 Methodology 
The sample population for this survey consists of students in their final year of 
study in the Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University (CU). This university was 
selected as it requires the highest results in the national secondary school exams of 
any public university in Cairo to earn acceptance into their Faculties of Engineering. 
The current study results are therefore based on the responses of 115 (CU) 
Engineering students in their final year of study to the research survey (Appendix A) 
and on the information shared by the students, and their colleagues falling outside the 
study parameters, in informal group conversations following the administration of the 
survey3. 
                                                 
3 The initial intention of the study was to include two public and one private university, namely Ain 
Shams University, Cairo University and the American University in Cairo respectively. These 
universities were chosen to represent both the top ranking private and public institutions with faculties 
of Engineering in Cairo. However, after initial efforts showed that reaching a representative sample of 
one particular graduating class (specifically that of 2010) across all three universities would prove 
nearly impossible for the researcher alone, the sample population was narrowed to focus on only the 
class graduating from Cairo University. The overall sample reached by the researcher consisted of 442 
students and recent graduates from universities across Cairo in addition to Alexandria University. Over 
half of the responses gathered were drawn from Cairo University, while another 15.8% came from Ain 
Shams, 16.3% from the American University in Cairo and 12.1% from Alexandria University. 
Appendix C: Survey Answers for Primary Universities Sampled provides the answers given to the 
survey questionnaire for the population of students reached from each of the primary universities 
sampled to illustrate whether the same patterns found in the Cairo University students are reflected in 
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The 115 students represent approximately 5% of the graduating class of 
engineers from CU4, and can reasonably be considered representative of the opinions 
of this class as responses were monitored throughout the collection stage to ensure 
that the final sample population’s opinions and intentions were converging as the 
research progressed. 
The research survey consists of questions addressing the students’ intent to 
migrate or remain and aims to enable the researcher to determine whether students 
have realistic expectations surrounding migration and ascertain which students have 
seriously considered the subject preceding the survey by asking more detailed 
questions about expected costs and plans upon arrival in the destination country. The 
survey questions also try to address the nuances of the migration experience by 
requesting that students divulge their motivations for departure if they intend to leave, 
whether this decision is for permanent migration or temporary, what networks exist in 
their destination countries, as well as what financial costs and benefits they expect to 
experience through their decision to migrate. 
The survey was designed in English, edited several times, translated into 
Arabic and translated back into English to ensure that the meaning behind each of the 
questions was uniform. In order to gather data on the migration intentions of a 
representative sample of the student body, the research survey was administered to 
students both online and in person on the CU campus. Both the online survey and the 
paper survey were generated using surveymonkey.com5, a web site specializing in 
survey design that facilitated the creation of a portable document format (PDF) that 
                                                                                                                                            
the overall student/recent graduate population, recognizing that this larger sample is not representative 
of the intentions of the overall student population at each of these universities. 
4 Based on the student body information found in Cairo University, 2008.  
5 http://www.surveymonkey.com/. 
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was still easy to read and user-friendly for the in person survey administration. In 
order to ensure that there would be no language barriers hindering the success of the 
survey, each question and answer was written in both English and Arabic side by side 
so that students would not need to choose one over the other and could refer to either 
at any point. 
To reach the initial broader sample population, the researcher used class email 
lists, by requesting them from Deans, professors, students and/or IT personnel from 
each of the Faculties, if such email lists are used regularly by the students and alumni 
at each of the target universities, with a link to the survey for students to take on their 
own time. The online reach was the initial step in the administration of the survey as it 
allowed the researcher to begin to see patterns emerging that assisted in the 
formulation of questions for the students surveyed in person, which the researcher 
asked in informal group discussions following the administration of the survey. 
The in-person surveys were in effect administered using a diversified snowball 
method, whereby the researcher sought out students from different groups within the 
graduating class at CU and requested that they either administer it to their classmates 
or inform as many students within their reach about the survey and encourage them to 
complete it (whether virtually by providing their email address, or on campus). In 
order to avoid duplicate surveys, the students were requested to provide a mobile 
number that was used only for identification purposes as names may be duplicated. 
The mix of responses gathered from both the snowball survey method and the online 
sample should alleviate network biases in the results that could arise from utilizing 
only the snowball method, and accessibility issues that could have come from using 
only the online survey. 
14 
 
Data from the survey was funneled directly through surveymonkey—
immediately for those taking the survey online and manually for the responses 
collected on CU’s campus. The web site was then also used as the primary tool for the 
data analysis, as it permitted the researcher to apply filters to see respondents fitting 
only a specific set of criteria easily and cross-tabulate student answers to identify 
trends in intentions to migrate.  
1.2 Country Migration Context 
Wendell Cleland’s assertion was likely valid until the 1950s when Egyptian 
emigration really began6. The "military revolution of 1952 tipped the balance of 
power among the country's ethnic groups in favor of the native majority," 
economically and politically, in part by employing nationalization and sequestration 
laws, resulting in the large-scale emigration of British and French  groups initially, 
followed by a slow but steady migration of Greek and Italians, and of Jews following 
19567. From the early 1960s, members of the Coptic community began to emigrate 
for fear of increased discrimination8 and a permanent migration of Egyptians began 
for social, political and economic reasons9. Additional nationalization laws the 
following decade led to the emigration of the Syrio-Lebanese and Armenian 
communities remaining10. Egypt’s early emigration patterns went through three 
distinct phases differing in their makeup and destinations. The phase spanning from 
1965 to 1975 was characterized by skilled and unskilled teachers and construction 
                                                 
6 Ayman Zohry Barbara Harrell-Bond, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration," (Cairo: Forced Migration 
and Refugee Studies Programme, American University in Cairo, 2003). 
7 Fouad Assad, "Egyptians - Migration," The Encyclopedia of Canada's People. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Howaida Roman, "Emigration Policy in Egypt," in Cooperation project on the social integration of 
immigrants, migration, and the movement of persons (European University Institute, 2006). 
10 Assad, "Egyptians - Migration." 
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workers heading mainly to the GCC states and Libya11. The numbers of emigrants 
remained low until 1974 following the oil boom in the Gulf and Libya that allowed 
for development programs to be implemented. Also at this time, in 1971, the Egyptian 
government lifted restrictions on labor migration which was necessary to enable 
Egyptian workers to emigrate per Article 52 of the Egyptian Constitution that states 
that citizens have the right to permanent or temporary migration as regulated by the 
terms set forth by law12. Law 73 then mandated a right for all public sector and 
government employees to return to their positions within a year of having submitted 
their resignation, later extending this right to two years following resignation while 
also removing other potential impediments to Egyptian migration13. These actions 
facilitated the second phase of migration, from 1975-1985, which was composed 
mainly of unskilled rural migrant workers in agriculture and construction going over 
to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq14. In 1975, there were 370,000 Egyptian migrants 
working in the Arab region, out of a total of about 655,000 globally. This total 
number had reached over a million by 1980. By 1983, demand peaked and an 
estimated 3.28 million Egyptian workers were abroad. The demand declined again 
after 1983 with the changing political and economic situation in the Arab oil-
producing states15.  
The decline of emigration carried through to the next phase of migration, from 
1985 to 1995, when the makeup of the migrants shifted back to include skilled and 
unskilled migrants, but differing from the first phase in the professions departing as 
                                                 
11 Leila Simona Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point 
of Departure: The Case of Egypt," (The British Academy, 2003). 
12 "The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt," (1971); Ayman Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the 
European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen," (Danish Institute for International 
Studies, 2006). 
13 Ayman Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration," IOM and Cooperazione Italiana (2003). 
14 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
15 Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen." 
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this phase was composed of scientists and agriculture workers, working in Saudi 
Arabia16. In 1986, the number of Egyptian workers abroad has dropped to 2.25 
million and remained at around this level through the early 1990s17. The 1996 census 
indicated a slight rise back in the Egyptian emigrant numbers, placing them at 
approximately 2.8 million18. The number now seems to have risen slightly over the 
average for the third phase, with national estimates recording about 2.7 million 
Egyptian workers abroad in 2003, and between 3 and 5 million in 200619. The 
Egyptian migrant population therefore makes up approximately 4 percent of Egypt’s 
total population, and about 1.5 percent of the migrant population overall. 
Approximately two-thirds of Egyptian migration is considered temporary and 
involved migration to one of the oil-rich Arab states. Within this type of migration, 
about half of the migrants are absorbed by Saudi Arabia20. 
1.3 Laws Governing Migration in Egypt 
Egyptian migration policy has only been stated concretely once, in 1983, with 
the introduction of the “Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law” no. 111, 
which was to be implemented by the Ministry for Manpower and Emigration and 
covered provisions for both permanent and temporary migrants21. While no other 
document comprehensively addresses the Egyptian government’s aims and obligation 
                                                 
16 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
17 Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen." 
18 Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration." 
19 Barbara Harrell-Bond, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration."; Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their 
Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: The Case of Egypt."; Ayman Zohry, 
"Attitudes of Egyptian Youth Towards Migration to Europe," in Information Dissemination on 
Migration (2006). 
20 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
21 Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration." 
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as they pertain to migration, the actions, policies and statements made by policy 
makers imply the following as their primary goals for Egyptian migration: 
1.  Encouraging emigration to ensure equilibrium in the domestic labor 
market; 
2.  Fighting illegal migration; 
3.  Maximizing the economic benefits of migration and increasing migrants’ 
remittances; 
4.  Ensuring the welfare of emigrants; and 
5.  Meeting labor demand in receiving countries.22  
Law no.111 places under the auspices of the appropriate minister the task of 
identifying migrants as either permanent or temporary, and recommends that, through 
consultation with appropriate other ministries, courses be established to prepare 
potential migrants for their voyage and work in the host country, and to ensure that 
cultural and religious heritage are saved in some manner among the migrant 
communities abroad23. The Higher Committee for Migration (HCM), created in 1997 
by Prime Minister Resolution no. 2000 to fulfill Article 4 of Law no. 11124, was 
intended to not only provide for these pre-departure needs and maintain strong ties 
with Egyptian migrants abroad, but also facilitate both temporary and permanent 
return25. Currently, the HCM serves predominantly as a policy and liaison 
committee26, and has not reached its intended audience domestically as evidenced by 
the slim 5.5% of respondents in the current research study who list the Egyptian 
government as one of the resources they have utilized in their search for information 
about their intended destination countries. 
                                                 
22 Ayman Zohry, "The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France," (Florence: Euro-
Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM), Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2009). 
23 Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration." 
24 The HCM, as outlined in Article 4 of Law no. 111, is to be composed at minimum of representatives 
from the Ministries of Education and Scientific Research, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy, 
Planning, Defense,  Information, Tourism and Civil Aviation, Insurance, and Finance. "Emigration and 
Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111," Egyptian Government (1983). 
25 Article 5, Ibid. 
26 Zohry, "The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France." 
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The year preceding the formation of the HCM the responsibilities of the 
Minister of State for Emigration Affairs and Egyptians Abroad were transferred by 
Presidential Decree no. 165 to what is now the Ministry of Manpower and 
Emigration, thereby also shifting the leadership of the HCM to the Minister. 
The current strategy of the Emigration Sector focuses on two dimensions; first, 
developing work systems by introducing new technologies to establish an 
updated Egyptian Migration database that includes job opportunities abroad as 
well as numbers and statistics, and a computerized system through the Internet 
to link Egyptians abroad to their homeland. The second dimension of the 
Emigration Sector strategy is to reinforce the role of the “Union of Egyptians 
Abroad” and other civil society organizations that represent Egyptians outside 
the homeland.27 
To attain its goals, the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration has worked in 
conjunction with foreign governments and international organizations. The Italian 
government, for instance, funded the creation of the Migration Information System 
during the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) project in which the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) was the implementing party28. The 
pilot project, which was conducted from 2001-2004, was intended to create a means 
by which migratory flows could be controlled while simultaneously ensuring ease of 
integration for Egyptians intending to emigrate29. The outputs of the project consisted 
of a website with job opportunities abroad also serving as a portal for Egyptian 
migrants overall. The 1,605,659.22 € grant enabled the creation of an information 
platform, currently highlighting France, Italy, Norway and Spain, to which migrants 
and potential migrants can refer30. It also quite notably created a job matchmaking 
service meant to provide a platform through which Egyptian job seekers and Italian 
entrepreneurs and employers were able to find one another easily for clear mutual 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Italian Cooperation in Egypt, "Http://Www.Utlcairo.Org/English/Progetti/Progetti/11.Html." 
30 Zohry, "The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France." 
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benefit. 1,500 applicants, out of an applicant pool of 170,000, were selected for 
interviews for positions ranging from assistant cook, to construction workers to 
engineers, and 178 were chosen to work in Italy and received 3 months of language 
training prior to their departure31. Despite the very low number of successful 
candidates, the initial mass of applications indicates a demand a placement service 
that would provide migrants with an accessible legal mode of accessing their desired 
country of destination, while also benefiting the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and 
Emigration in that it will now be more involved in the migration of its citizens of 
concern from stage one.  
 The strategy of information provision as a means of regulating migration 
flows into Italy also served as the basis for the implementation of the “Information 
Dissemination for the Prevention of Irregular Migration from the Arab Republic of 
Egypt” project launched in 2006/7. This project however uses information about legal 
modes of emigration in addition to providing more realistic views of the realities of 
emigration, rather than direct entry job placements, to deter illegal migration32. The 
steadily increasing restrictions “by the Schengen agreements, the third pillar on justice 
and Home affairs, the Dublin Convention, and the few legislative provisions more 
recently adopted under the new title on migration instituted by the Amsterdam 
Treaty” have lead to an increase in irregular migration in the EU as well as a 
“progressive ‘securitisation’ of migration”, whereby migration itself is viewed as a 
security issue necessitating the attention of security agencies33. A comparative study 
by Eurostat found that of the Egyptian respondents, almost none had attempted to 
enter or remain in a host country illegally. Six percent successfully attempted 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Leila S. Talani, "Out of Egypt: Globalisation, Marginalisation and Illegal Muslim Migration to the 
Eu" (Los Angeles, CA, 2005). 
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undocumented migration, with 24% heading to each Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan, 
10% to Italy and another 10% to other EU countries. The countries of choice for 
undocumented migration mirrored the routes for migrants traveling legally. The 10% 
of those who said they had arrived or stayed undocumented who chose Italy as their 
destination, compose 40% of the total number of Egyptian respondents in Italy34. The 
two most common means of undocumented entry for Egyptians entering into Italy are 
first, “entry through Libya to the coasts of Italy or entry through the eastern borders of 
Schengen zone,” and second, regular entry by securing a tourist or business “visit 
visa,” and overstaying to work undocumented aided by networks in Italy. The latter 
option, while favorable as the safer mode of entry, is also the more expensive 
option35. 
The law has also put forth regulations to attempt to further harness the 
potential developmental gains that could arise from the large sums being remitted 
back into Egypt every year. It aims to address the exact infrastructural fears that may 
lead migrant families to shy away from investing within the state, since remittance 
income constitutes approximately 21 percent of foreign investment within Egypt36. 
The law notes migrant rights to sponsorship and grants exemptions from taxes and 
fees on the returns earned by emigrants on their investments in Egyptian banks. 
Furthermore, “migrants’ capital utilized in investment projects in Egypt is to be 
granted the same advantages granted to foreign capital37. 
 
34 Eurostat, "Push and Pull Factors of International Migration: A Comparative Report," ed. Eurostat 
(Luxembourg: 2000). 
35 Zohry, "The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France." 
36 Peter Gammeltoft, "Remittances and Other Financial Flows to Developing Countries," International 
Migration 40, no. 5 (2002). 
37 Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration." 
2. WHO EMIGRATES AND WHERE DO THEY CHOOSE TO GO? 
2.1 Traditional Migration Patterns of Egyptians 
It is said that Egypt is now experiencing “the permanence of temporary 
migration” as the long-standing norm of migrating to the Arab states has turned into 
an ever-replenishing presence of an Egyptian labor force within the Arab receiving 
states38. The remaining third of the existing migrant Egyptian diaspora is 
predominantly found in the West, and consists of those whose migration intention is 
more permanent39. The correlation between Arab state migration and temporary 
migration and Western state migration and permanence coincides with the rights 
afforded to migrants in their respective destinations. Western states are considered to 
afford a path to permanence, through their permissive allowances in rights and 
naturalization, thereby attracting those migrants whose departure is meant to be 
permanent in nature40. Egyptian migrants in the West are disproportionately present 
in North America, with slightly over half of the 824,000 migrants in 2000 distribute
between the United States and Canada
d 
                                                
41. European states account for approximately 
40 percent of the remaining migrants’ destinations, with Italy and Greece being the 
main European destinations and Italy being considered Egyptians’ main destination 
for over two decades42.  
 Findings from a 2006 survey of a sample of 1,552 young Egyptian men, aged 
18 to 40, showed that the current Egyptian emigration to Europe closely resembled 
 
38 Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen." 
39 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
40 Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen." 
41 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
42 Ayman Zohry, "Migration without Borders: North Africa as a Reserve of Cheap Labour for Europe," 
(UNESCO, 2006). 
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past migration to Arab states in that migrants set a particular goal that they plan to 
achieve and intend to return once they have realized it. The demography of Egyptian 
migrants seems much more homogeneous with migrants arising mainly from a 
particular “age, sex and educational status. They are predominantly concentrated in 
young age groups, with more males than females, and with a relatively high 
educational status, especially among those from an urban background”43. Most 
permanent migrants ranged from 30 to 49 years of age, with this demographic 
constituting one third of the total migrant population. A notable distinction however 
arose within this age group as migrants aged 30-39 years generally initiated their 
permanent migration from Egypt, while the age group ranging from 40-49 acquired 
their second nationality after having lived abroad44. In a survey conducted by Egypt’s 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics in 1987, results indicated that 
97.7 percent of migrants stemming from Egypt were male45, leaving 76 percent of 
sending households to be headed by married women whose spouses were abroad and 
remitting back support for their household . 89.8 percent of the migrants were aged 
between 20 and 44, with 63.5 percent of emigrants being married46.  
The recent survey found that most of the push factors were largely economic, 
with young migrants hoping to evade bad living conditions, low wages/salaries, lack 
of opportunity, unemployment and the income disparities between Egypt and the 
                                                 
43 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
44 Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration." 
45 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
46 Ibid. 
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receiving country of choice47. On the pull side, youth noted that friends and family in 
the host country constituted an important factor in their choice of destination48.  
Migration of Egyptian youth to Europe is managed and activated by family 
kinship and ties while migration of Egyptians to Arab Gulf countries are 
usually managed by a set of regulations, certified migration brokers, and many 
other conditions. Migration to Europe is concentrated in a set of Egyptian 
villages in specific governorates; each village has its own destination; the two 
major destinations are Italy and France.49 
These networks influence migrants’ knowledge upon arrival in the country about the 
labor market and expected wage rates which enables them to search for higher paid 
positions and had been found to decrease the time some migrants spend in the 
receiving country. After having accounted for economic situation of the host state and 
personal traits of the migrants, it was found that an established network increases the 
percentage of migrants who will stay in the host country for less than a year by 11 
percent, from 2 to 13 percent50. This negative correlation can be attributed to the 
lowered initial costs of migrants with a network experience which, when coupled with 
these migrants’ access to higher wages as mentioned, enables them to recuperate the 
costs tied to their migration much faster, thereby allowing them the option of 
returning sooner than persons who do not have access to an established network. 
Length of stay also differs by country of destination as most Egyptian 
migrants head to Western states intending on migrating permanently, with 55.5 
percent of those going to Western Europe and 93 percent of those going to the U.S. 
and Australia answering this way, while those migrating to Arab countries all (100 
                                                 
47 Zohry, "Attitudes of Egyptian Youth Towards Migration to Europe." 
48 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
49 Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen." 
50 Ira N. Gang Thomas Bauer, "Networks and the Duration of Temporary Migration," (2002). 
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percent) intend to return to Egypt51. Those who intended to migrate more permanently 
to a Western state tended to be highly educated/skilled professionals, who were 
mainly concentrated in medical, engineering and educational practices52. Notably, 
however, the skill set of those heading to Western destinations is declining as 
compared to that of the migrants to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s as many young 
Egyptians are more actively trying to emigrate now because of the increasingly 
difficult economic and employment environments, sometimes even turning to 
irregular modes of migration in order to escape53. Migrants with work contracts in the 
host country were also found to spend more time that their counterparts without such 
contracts, since their wages in the receiving state are more stable and predictable54. 
The historical patterns of movement of Egyptian migrants have been well 
researched historically, however the effect of Egyptian migratory flows on Egypt 
itself is an area that is still in need of particular scrutiny. This research aims to fill a 
gap in this knowledge area by looking at the intended migration patterns of a new 
generation of migrants in Egypt and discussing the implications, beyond the 
traditional discussions of costs and remittances, that affect the sending state in terms 
of its domestic labor market and skill set. 
2.2 Demographic Makeup of the Sample Population 
In his surveys of three Egyptian sending communities, Adams found that 
“international migrants were self-selected on the basis of higher education”55.  The 
                                                 
51 Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: 
The Case of Egypt." 
52 Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen." 
53 Ibid. 
54 Thomas Bauer, "Networks and the Duration of Temporary Migration." 
55 Joaquin Arango J. Edward Taylor, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Douglas S. Massey, Adela 
Pellegrino, "International Migration and National Development," Population Index 62, no. 2 (1996). 
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analysis of the migratory intentions of this class of engineering students is based on 
the sample of 115 students drawn from Cairo University’s graduating class of 
approximately 2300 students56.  The choice of engineering students was based on 
several factors, prime among them is the relatively more accessible data on the field 
of engineering, which will be necessary in the calculations of the effect of the 
intended migration patterns on the labor market in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the 
quantifiable nature of the outcomes of engineers’ work, for the most part, makes the 
cost-gain analysis for this field easier to define as compared to that for social sciences 
graduates. Engineers also contribute to infrastructural growth where they work, and 
therefore lost engineers could, in theory, be a great loss for any sending state. For 
these reasons, this research chose to focus on the field of engineering as a quantifiable 
source of data with the potential to impact both the home and host countries 
significantly. 
The study sample is composed of 90 men and 25 women ranging in age 
between 19 and 25, most of whom (99%) are unmarried. 89% of the students 
surveyed are Muslim, and 11% Christian.  Of the students surveyed, all but eight were 
born in Egypt. Of these only two have a citizenship in another state, but listed that 
they were raised in Egypt. Approximately 75% of respondents were raised in Greater 
Cairo, while the 25% remaining were raised throughout both Lower and Upper Egypt. 
Of those who answered the question regarding family income (101 
respondents), the majority (approximately 81%) estimated their household income 
                                                 
56 Exact numbers on the size of the graduating class of students from the Faculty of Engineering at 
Cairo University in 2010 were not available at the time of writing this thesis, however this estimate was 
calculated based on the number of students in the Class of 2010 as second and third year students, and 
the rate of returning students as compared to those experienced by the Class of 2009, whose numbers 
were available. “Student Guidebook,” (2008); “Student Guidebook,” (2009). 
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was under 7000 EGP/month, with 19% of households bringing in less than 1000 
EGP/month. The pool of respondents is therefore composed primarily of students who 
are from middle income (30.7%), lower-middle income (31.7%) and lower income 
(18.8%) families. 
While nearly 100% of the respondents currently rely on family support for 
income, with only 3.6% listing work as one of their means of supporting themselves, 
the percentages are reversed when students are asked how they will support 
themselves following graduation. 100% of the students noted that they intend to 
support themselves through their work income. This is particularly notable as the 
female respondents, who now entirely rely on family support for their livelihoods 
listed only their savings, and not family support as their male counterparts listed, as 
the source of income to supplement their employment following graduation. The men 
however, specifically those whose household belonged to the middle class or above, 
listed both savings and family support as sources of income in addition to their post-
graduation employment. Currently, 9.7% of students intend to utilize their savings to 
contribute to their own expenditures, and this number decreases slightly to 8% 
following graduation.  
Of the students surveyed, only 9 have worked outside Egypt before, 7 in 
Europe, including one female student, and 2 in other Arab countries. 
While the current study will not sufficiently delve into the cultural nuances 
that increase the relevance of gender distinctions in the analysis of this data, future 
research would benefit from such a focus. Where gender distinctions are highlighted, 
they are intended to draw attention to a pattern that the author believes is noteworthy 
either because the level of independence in it can be considered out of the ordinary 
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within the context of cultural and social norms in Egypt or because the pattern itself 
defies traditional gender roles. 
2.3 Where does this generation of engineers want to go? 
Before entering into a discussion of the emigration intentions of the sample 
student population, we must define the terms as they were understood by the sample. 
The Arabic translation of emigration (hegra) and that for work abroad (3amal bel 
khareg) were both used in the survey to distinguish between the students’ intentions 
and to pinpoint whether the trends indicate a desire for permanent or temporary labor 
migration. While the term for emigration does imply permanence of migration, it is 
often used in Egypt to indicate a longer term temporary migration intention, and 
therefore intention to emigrate is analyzed taking into consideration the potential 
return of the migrant.  
Case in point, of those who answered that they do intend to emigrate, several 
responded to the question of whether they intend to return to Egypt permanently after 
some time abroad affirmatively, indicating that these particular respondents, while 
they do intend to leave Egypt for some time, are thinking of a more temporary 
migration rather than final emigration.  
The data in  
Figure 1 is based on the responses of 86 respondents who noted that they do 
intend to work abroad in the future. 77.5% of respondents intend to work abroad at 
some point in the future, including one third of the female respondents surveyed. A 
few respondents listed several countries/regions, reflected here. 
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Figure 1 - Intended Destination Regions for Work 
Intended Destination Regions for Work
7%
29%
1%
2%
22%
21%
18%
Anywhere
Arab
Asia
Australia
Europe
North America
Not Specified
 
21 respondents (18%), including one female student, indicated that they 
already have been offered a chance to work abroad, split with 12 having been 
promised employment upon arrival and nine holding formal contracts.  Of those with 
formal contracts, five are bound for Arab states, three for European states and one for 
Japan. Of those with promises of employment upon their arrival to the destination 
state, 11 were promised these in Arab states while one was headed for the United 
States. The differences in intended periods of residence in the receiving states are 
notable for this group as they reflect the historical migratory intentions of Egyptians 
as they were discussed above. The temporary nature of migration to Arab states is 
reflected in this sub-sample of the students who already have employment 
opportunities abroad. Those heading to Arab states intend to stay in their destinations 
between 2-15 years with an average of slightly over 6 years, with only one intending a 
permanent move and two uncertain about the intended duration of their voyage. The 
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one respondent headed for Japan is intending on staying between three to five years, 
while the one heading to North America is planning to stay for ten years. Of the three 
heading to Europe however, only one has limited his stay to five to ten years, while 
the other two intend to remain. 
Of the students who have found employment abroad of either sort, only three 
have had previous work experience, and only two in the country where they intend to 
work following graduation. Slightly over half of these students are heading to 
countries where they have a network, and will be helped by family and friends across 
their home country and the receiving countries; those remaining who are heading to 
countries where they do not have a network, listed friends and family in addition to 
migration brokers to arrive at their final destination. Only two of the students leaving 
for an employment opportunity, one for the UAE and the other for the UK, are 
currently taking the equivalence exams to enable them to work in the work in their 
receiving country. 
When asked about their intentions to emigrate, irrespective of job prospects, 
the majority of the sample population responded that they intend to emigrate from 
Egypt at some point, with 23.6% planning to do so in 3-5 years, 18.2% saying they do 
not yet have concrete plans, and 17.3% planning on leaving within 1-2 years. For 
those intending to emigrate, the gender composition was split 90%-10% male to 
female. A notably high number of respondents (36.4%), composed nearly evenly of 
females, said they did not intend to emigrate. While almost 73% of the male 
respondents indicated a desire to emigrate, the female respondents’ answers weighed 
nearly just as heavily against emigration, with close to 70% saying they did not have 
the intention to emigrate from Egypt in the future. Furthermore, the women who did 
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indicate a desire to emigrate had not yet made concrete plans as opposed to the men 
whose answers signaled more urgency in their emigration intentions with the bulk of 
those emigrating intending to do so within the next five years. 
Differences arise when comparing destination countries of those who intend to 
leave Egypt for work ( 
Figure 1) and those who intend on longer term migration (Figure 2). For those 
who intend to emigrate, far fewer are undecided, and a sizeable majority is split 
between North America and Europe as their desired host. The drop, while not severe, 
in those listing the Arab region as their destination for emigration as compared to 
those listing it for work is noteworthy as it reflects the traditional thinking that Arab 
states are a plausible option for long-term migration as they do not provide a path to 
integration as European and North American states offer. 
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Figure 2 - Intended Destination Regions for Emigration 
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Of those who responded with an intention to emigrate, whether those who had 
concrete plans to emigrate within a few years or those who just had the general 
intention, 88% noted that they do intend to return to Egypt at some point in the future. 
This included several of the women who were not intending on emigrating or working 
abroad, perhaps indicating an intention to emigrate for family purposes after marriage, 
which would also explain why the women for the most part who do intend to leave 
either do not know when their intended departure is, or also state they do not know 
how long they will stay abroad. This trend plays into traditional gender roles as well 
in that, while the women might have an interest in life abroad, it may not be socially 
acceptable for their parents to approve of such a decision before the women are 
married. As a question about whether the move is motivate by marriage was not 
included in the survey, the discrepancy in the answers discussed above is the only 
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indication that societal norms may be the only obstacle preventing these women from 
making their own concrete plans for emigration. 
Intended duration of stay abroad overall ranged from one year to 20 years for 
those who specified, and “Once I make enough money abroad” and “Don’t Know” for 
those whose intentions have not been decided beyond the point of departure. The 
majority of answers fall within the 3-10 year range, regardless of how soon after 
graduation they intend to leave.  
2.3.1 Networks 
A vast majority of respondents 79.1% know someone who has already 
emigrated, with most listing family among those they know abroad, 11.8% listed that 
their parents had emigrated previously, and 49.1% noted that members of their 
extended families had emigrated. 51.8% said they know a friend who has emigrated. 
Since a friend might well be within the same age range as the respondents, it is key to 
also look into the migration intentions of the respondents based on whether a friend of 
theirs has already emigrated. 77.2% with a friend who has already emigrated intend to 
also leave Egypt, with the majority of those (75%) having already decided on a 
specific timeline for departure ranging from graduation to 10 years, weighed heavily 
toward 5 years or sooner.  
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Table 1 - Knowledge of Other Emigrants by Intent to Emigrate 
Do you know people who have emigrated already? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟لبق نم اورجاه سانأ فرعت له 
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the future?  يونت له
؟لبقتسملا يف رصم نم ةرجهلا     
Answer Options 
Yes, this 
year  ،معن
 اذه للاخ
ماعلا 
Yes, in 
1-2 
years 
 للاخ ،معن
 وأ ماع
نينثا 
Yes, in 
3-5 
years 
للاخ ،معن 
 ىلإ ةثلاث
 ةسمخ
ماوعأ 
Yes, in 
6-10 
years 
 للاخ ،معن
 ىلإ ةتس
 ةرشع
ماوعأ 
Yes, but 
I don’t 
have 
concrete 
plans yet 
 نكل ،معن
 يدل سيل
 ةددحم ططخ
دعب 
No, I 
do not 
intend 
to 
emigra
te  لا ،لا
 يونأ
ةرجهلا 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, my parents ايدلاو ،معن 0 1 4 0 3 5 12.0% 8 
Yes, my brother يخأ ،معن 0 1 0 0 0 1 1.9% 1 
Yes, my sister يتخأ ،معن 0 1 1 0 1 0 2.8% 3 
Yes, a member of my extended 
family  يترسأ دارفأ نم درف ،معن
ةعسوملا 
0 9 15 1 11 16 48.1% 36 
Yes, a friend يل قيدص ،معن 2 16 13 2 11 12 51.9% 44 
No, I don't know anyone who 
has emigrated رجاه ادحأ فرعأ لا ،لا 0 1 2 1 4 15 21.3% 8 
answered question 108 
skipped question 2 
 
Approximately 67% of those with immediate or extended family members 
abroad intend to migrate as well. Of those who have family and/or friends abroad, 
slightly more than 2/3 intend to go to the same countries where their networks reside. 
Approximately half of those following their network intend to go to North America, 
while the remainder is split fairly evenly between Europe and the Arab states, with 
only one respondent listing Australia as a destination where he intends to join 
Egyptian emigrants. 
The vast majority of potential emigrants from the graduating class of 
engineers at CU seek information about their future countries of destination either 
from family and friends (71.2%) or their own personal research, including internet 
research (listed by 57.5% of respondents), general personal research (30.7%) and 
consuming media-dispensed information (30.1%), or combination thereof. Only 5.5% 
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of students surveyed listed the Egyptian government as one of their sources of 
information, while twice that percentage resorted to information from their country of 
destination’s embassy. 
Having a network, consisting of family (30.4%) or friends (20.3%), in the host 
country appears to be useful for those students who intend on emigrating, as students 
listed these persons as ones who will help them migrate. 23.2% listed that they will 
seek the help of a migration broker. The anticipated costs associated with migration 
average at almost 26,000 EGP, with only 8.3% (those planning to leave within the 
next five years) of students noting that they had begun saving for their departure from 
Egypt with some even having surpassed the amount they anticipate to need. Cost 
expectations vary widely extending from 2000 EGP to 150,000 EGP, although the 
bulk of students expect a cost ranging between 10,000-30,000 EGP.  
According to Zohry, historical reported costs of migration to Europe from 
Egypt ranged from 5,000 EGP, as paid by about 13.7 percent of migrants, to 50,000 
EGP, which was the cost for about 1.6 percent of migrants. These costs simply cover 
facilitation expenses but do not cover the cost of transportation itself nor do they 
include documentation fees. The average cost for this trajectory was calculated to be 
15,890 EGP, with 70 percent of migrants having paid between 5,000 EGP and 40,000 
EGP57.  
In the current study sample,  it is clear that not all the students responding with 
an estimate of their projected migration costs have already researched the expenses as 
evidenced by the very broad spectrum of estimates provided. Based on the informal 
conversations surrounding the topic, the students listed estimates that accounted for a 
                                                 
57 Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen." 
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range of costs associated with migration. Some students evaluated that the cost of 
migration was simply the cost of purchasing a ticket to their destination and rent costs 
for the first couple of months, while others calculated the overall costs including these 
and the costs of equivalence exams, among several other factors.It is quite interesting 
that those who expect assistance from Relatives or Friends in their destination 
country, and those seeking the assistance of a migration broker on average estimate 
the cost within 3000 EGP of one another, and fall right around the overall average for 
the estimates. Conversely, those with relatives in Egypt or non-Egyptian friends in the 
destination country assisting them, estimate the cost of migration at nearly 12,000 
EGP less than the average of the overall responses. This could perhaps indicate that 
students guided, or assisted, by persons who might not have emigrated or who may 
have emigrated at some point in the past may be obtaining a less than realistic 
portrayal of emigration, not only financially but also socially in terms of what to 
expect in the destination country. 
Almost two thirds of the students surveyed listed that their immediate family 
would assist them financially for their emigration, while about 10% also answered 
that extended family would contribute, and almost one third said that no one would 
assist them in meeting the financial needs of their migration decisions. 
2.4 Why do they want to emigrate? 
Figure 3 shows the reasons for the students’ emigration intentions, clearly 
demonstrating that prime among the factors impacting intention to emigrate from 
Egypt is the perception that monetary compensation of these skilled minds in Egypt 
will not match what is attainable abroad, and this is further exacerbated by the reason 
chosen by 27.3% of respondents that “No job opportunities in Egypt”. The “Other” 
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category provided interesting answers as several students noted that respectful 
treatment that they anticipate from people abroad is one reason they would like to 
migrate. One student also mentioned “democracy and human rights problems” 
specifically as his reason for wanting to emigrate, while several others noted that their 
academic aspirations drew them to the option of emigration.  
Figure 3 - Reasons for Emigration 
 
 
Students who included sending money home as one of the main reasons to emigrate 
were drawn from the middle income bracket and below, which coincides with the 
higher propensity for students from these socio-economic brackets to plan to remit 
even before their departure. The range of anticipated remittance transfers listed by the 
students whose emigration was partially prompted by the desire to remit, spanned 
from 15-45% of their salaries. 
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 Figure 4 - Reasons for Country of Destination 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the high value the students place on the increased job opportunities 
they anticipate finding upon placing themselves on the international job market, 
which nearly 54% of students list as a main draw to their target destination country.  
The push and pull factors seem to highlight economic success, educational 
opportunities and environmental woes as the primary reasons students aim to seek 
work, or permanent residence, abroad. These factors must therefore be addressed in 
policies seeking to address the needs of would-be emigrants to, if for no other reason, 
ensure that dissatisfaction with their home country does not deter them from remitting 
if they plan to do so, or from returning, even temporarily, to provide their sending 
state with knowledge based capital gains, comprising both social and human capital, 
as will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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3. SKILLED EMIGRATION 
3.1 Effect/Cost of Skilled Migration 
The emigration of highly educated nationals is one trend that is often said to 
have potential drawbacks for the sending countries. The brain drain phenomenon is 
believed to deprive the country of origin of its brightest minds, thereby utilizing the 
sending country’s best trained capital for the benefit of the receiving country leaving 
the country of origin to depend on their unskilled workforce as their engine for 
growth, and curtailing development in the home country58. 
 The emigration of skilled Egyptian workers to the United States can be taken 
as an example of this phenomenon. If we consider that real public expenditure in 1998 
in Egypt per student equaled about 338 USD for primary education, 527 USD for 
secondary education and 3337 USD for tertiary education59, we can calculate that the 
expense to the state of producing one engineer in 1998 was approximately 20,970 
USD60. This total cost in 2009 prices equals approximately 27,811 USD61. For the 
receiving state, on the other hand, gains from the emigration of these trained minds 
are sizable. In 1971-2, the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimated profits of 
20,000 USD annually from each qualified emigrant from developing countries. In 
                                                 
58 Riccardo Faini, "Migration, Remittances and Growth," Italian Ministry of the Economy and 
University of Brescia (2002). 
59 Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, "Building Human Capital for Economic Development in the Arab Countries," 
The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies Working Paper No. 76 (2002). 
60 This calculation makes three assumptions. The first is that time spent in primary school totaled five 
years, as compared to the current six years required in primary school, so as to reflect the cost 
expended by the state on the current study sample’s education. Secondly, the calculation assumes that 
real public expenditure on preparatory school, the three years following primary school in Egypt, 
equaled that spent on primary education so as not to over-estimate overall cost. Thirdly, the calculation 
does not account for differences in choices in tertiary education, as an engineer would presumably cost 
the state more or less in this stage as compared to persons choosing other fields of study. 
61 Prices adjusted using the Inflation Calculator tool provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. 
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1979, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) listed 
the market value of professional migrants aged 25-35 from Africa at 184,000 USD62. 
Adjusting for inflation, the range given by these estimations would equate to gains 
between 103,000 – 548,000 USD for the United States as a host county in current 
prices.  
Further depleting sending country national budgets, the expatriation of skilled 
minds from developing countries often necessitates a replacement of the departing 
domestic expertise with international expertise63. It is estimated, by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) “that the recourse to 
international experts costs developing countries almost 40 per cent of the public 
development aid they receive annually.”64  Yet, while the direct cost to the sending 
country, in terms of lost investment and knowledge replacement, does add up to a 
considerable amount, the effect of skilled labor force emigration differs tremendously 
depending on the home country situation, occupation and receiving country 
demands65. 
One striking fact is that the tertiary educated migrants are a small portion of 
the overall migrant population—especially in large sending countries such as 
Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. For example, between 10-15% of 
migrants have tertiary education in Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria as 
of year 2000. On the other hand, more than 50% of migrants to OECD 
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countries from other countries, including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and 
Jordan have tertiary education.66 
In a study on migration to Kuwait, emigrants from capital-poor Arab countries were 
found to be drawn “from the technical, skilled, and semiskilled sectors of society”. 
Emigrants coming from Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were found 
in positions in Kuwait that required secondary or post-secondary training67. Migrants 
from the Persian Gulf countries, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon take on positions 
requiring high levels of education in the OECD. In terms of positions in the receiving 
country, migrants from the Middle East and North Africa rank better than their Latin 
American counterparts and worse than Asian migrants, with 56% of Turkish migrants, 
47% of Tunisian migrants and 43% of Egyptian migrants obtaining skilled jobs and 
comparable levels in the remainder of the region’s countries68. These differences are 
key to note as such demands for specific skill sets will set the tone for future 
emigration patterns to the European Union, and other regions where demographic 
trends indicate future industry and labor supply gaps. These labor need projections 
can benefit states with excess labor force, albeit not through direct employment in the 
home country, by encouraging the excess supply of labor to be productive members of 
other states or regions. 
In purely economic terms, emigration is used to rectify market imbalances and 
wage differentials currently existing globally. As of 2005, 12.9 million people, or 
4.2% of the MENA population, had emigrated out of the region with most (52.2%) 
                                                 
66 Çaglar Özden, "Brain Drain in the Middle East & North Africa - the Patterns under the Surface" 
(paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and 
Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, 2006). 
67 J. Edward Taylor, "The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the 
Migration Process," International Migration 37, no. 1 (1999). 
68 Ibid. 
41 
 
heading to the OECD countries69. Trusting in the invisible hand of the market, 
emigration is easily justifiable as a counter-balance to the divergent capital, labor and 
income realities visible in the world market70. Incorporating demographic projections 
of the Middle East to this idea of the invisible hand further illustrates the necessity of 
forethought in emigration policies. According to UNDP’s population projections for 
the Middle East and North Africa, the region’s population will grow from 284 million 
in 2000 to 410 million inhabitants in 2020. Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen will 
experience the greatest growth rates, while the largest populations will be in Egypt, 
with 91 million, Algeria and Morocco with 41 million inhabitants each, Yemen with 
37 million and Saudi Arabia with 33 million71. These growth rates if not coupled with 
equally expedient job creation will inevitably lead to a repeat of the high 
unemployment rates witnessed in much of the Middle East in the 1990s “ranging from 
8% in Saudi Arabia, 15% in Tunisia, and as high as 22% and 28% in Morocco and 
Algeria”72.  
Such demographic changes therefore will necessitate global cooperation to 
absorb demand for market positions in settings where infrastructure and job provision 
has yet to catch up. Regional alleviation of these market pressures for the Maghreb 
and Mashrek seems the least plausible option, while international market absorption 
would be most logical given, for example, the European Union’s growing demand for 
labor and “dwindling population and labourforce”73. Even with the existing labor 
dynamics, Kuwait, Syria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia hope to reduce their rates of 
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emigration, with the latter two taking measures to encourage the return of their 
migrants74. In 2001, Egypt’s official view on migration saw immigration levels as 
adequate but hoped to lower them, and emigration levels as too low aiming to raise 
them75. This policy decision is particularly noteworthy when compared with the 
projected labor force growth, as Syria and Saudi Arabia—two states that would like to 
lower their rates of emigration—will experience a comparable labor growth rate to 
that of Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, whose response is to encourage emigration of their 
nationals. Yet, even with state policies to encourage or discourage their nationals’ 
migration patterns, the determining factor of whether emigration will serve to 
alleviate overcrowding of the labor force in source countries will inevitably be based 
on the training and qualifications demanded by the receiving states.  
3.2 Impact of Skilled Emigration on Domestic Unemployment 
Similarly, on a domestic level, mismatched distribution of skills and education 
to domestic market needs muddies unemployment projections as even sound 
emigration policy aimed at alleviating labor surplus in specific industries would leave 
behind a country with other industries scrambling to fill its positions with qualified 
persons. Egypt, for example, finds its brightest minds drawn to the prestige of 
particular careers, such as medicine and engineering, leaving emerging industries that 
have yet to garner comparable levels of recognition and esteem to fend for 
themselves76. In the current study sample, 87.2% of students noted that they would 
only accept engineering positions abroad, which is in keeping with their career 
projections for themselves following graduation as most students listed that they plan 
to join the workforce as an engineer with only a very small amount listing other 
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positions. However, as new entrants into the Egyptian labor market, these youth face 
the added challenge of the disproportional representation of their age group in 
unemployment statistics. The total unemployment for persons aged 15-29 in 1988 was 
82%, which grew to 84% in 1998 with most of these being first-time job seekers77. 
This particular sub-sample also faces the added complication of the high 
concentration of unemployed persons within the educated segments of society, with 
the highest concentration of unemployed persons (55%) being composed of those 
with intermediate education78, followed by university educated persons who 
constitute 14% of unemployment totals79. This counter-intuitive hindrance to 
successful market absorption further exemplifies the discord between the products o
the educational system in Egypt and the needs of the market i
f 
n the country.  
Figure 5 - Unemployment Projections for Egypt 2006-201180 
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According to United Nations projections, Egypt’s population is expected to 
grow to 96 million in 2026, and 114.8 million by 2065, when it is expected to 
stabilize81. The current population growth rate is approximately 1.4 million people per 
year, and with such rapid growth come high levels of unemployment. Official 
unemployment estimates show a drop from 9.2 percent unemployment in Egypt in 
1991-1992, to about 8.4 percent in 2000-2001, although independent estimates place 
the latter at around 14 percent82. In 2005, official estimates placed unemployment 
between 10 and 12 percent, while the independent assessment’s figure doubled this 
estimate83. In order to fully address these rates of unemployment, “Egypt will need to 
achieve a sustained real GDP growth rate of at least 6 percent per year. The economy 
has to generate between 600,000 and 800,000 new jobs each year in order to absorb 
new entrants into the labour force”84. For the period extending from 2001-2010, the 
labor supply in Egypt is predicted to grow at 2.6%, during which time “the average 
number of new job seekers will increase to 638,000 per year”85. However, contrary to 
what is needed, only about 370,000 new jobs were created each year from 1990 to 
199786, increasing slightly to 435,000 the following decade87, and Egypt’s real 
economic growth has declined from 5% to 2.1% per annum88. As seen in Figure 5, 
even the most optimistic growth projections for Egypt’s GDP, although it exceeds the 
6% thought to be needed in 2003, would not provide for the growing demands of the 
labor force for market absorption. 
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3.2.1 Calculations: How The Migration Intentions of This Graduating Class can 
Affect Unemployment 
This section will aim to quantify the problem of market absorption by utilizing 
published data on unemployment, annual engineering graduate numbers and the 
proportion of the labor market made up of skilled workers. This data will be used to 
estimate the numbers of positions available in the market for new entrants into the 
field of engineering and observe these in light of the migration intentions indicated by 
the current research sample. From there these calculations will quantify proposed 
means of addressing unemployment, both by specifying needed increases in labor 
market position provision and by assessing whether policies aimed at fostering and 
encouraging the migration intentions of the current class in future graduating classes 
would be beneficial. 
These calculations are the researcher’s own and are listed here step by step to 
elucidate the intention behind each calculation. Remainders are kept throughout the 
steps to ensure that the final predictions of numbers needed to address unemployment 
in Egypt are not over- or under-valued. 
Step 1: Calculate unemployment in the field of engineering based on estimation of 
unemployment assuming neutral growth rate89: 
Unemployment = 2,345,09190 
If university educated persons account for 14% of unemployment91 
then, university unemployment = 0.14 x (2,345,091) 
   ≈ 328,313 
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If engineers account for 6% of all higher education in labor force92 
then, engineering unemployment = 0.6 x (328,312.74) 
      = 19,698.7644 
Therefore, engineering unemployment in 2011 ≈ 19,699 
Step 2: Calculate number of engineers in labor force calculations for 2011 
Assuming neutral growth rate: 
 Labor force = 25,285,20593 
If university educated persons account for 12% of labor force94 
then, university educated labor force = 0.12 x (25,285,205) 
            ≈ 3,034,225 
If engineers account for 6% of higher education in labor force 
then, engineers in labor force = 0.6 x (3,034,224.6) 
            = 182,053.476 
Therefore, engineers in labor force in 2011 ≈ 182,053 
Step 3: Calculate unemployment level within the field of engineering 
If engineering unemployment in 2011 ≈ 19,69995 
and engineers in labor force in 2011 ≈ 182,05396 
 then, 2011 engineers have 10.8% unemployment 
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Step 4: Calculate the number of engineering graduates per year 
Using the same number of students of engineering in the public universities as that for 
2002/200397: 104,081 
then, graduating students ≈ (104,081) / 5 (years of study) 
    = 20,816.2 
Therefore, overall graduating class of engineers in Egypt ≈ 20,816 
Step 5: Calculate unemployment for class of new entrants into the field of engineering  
If unemployment level for new entrants into the market was proportional to that for 
the field of engineering overall 
then, ideal unemployment for graduating class = 0.108 x (20,816.2) 
              ≈ 2,248 
In reality however, the proportion of new students among unemployed is 82% due to 
the problem in Egypt of youth insertion in the market98 
Therefore, if engineering unemployment in 2011 is ≈ 19,699 
 then, actual unemployment for entrants in 2011 = 0.82 x (19,698.7644) 
            = 16,152.987 
Actual unemployment for new entrants in 2011 ≈ 16,153 
Step 6: Calculate jobs created per year for new entrants into engineering 
If new jobs created per year = 435,000 
then, new jobs for university educated persons = 0.12 x (435,000) 
   = 52,200 
Of these, 6% are for engineers in work force  = 0.6 x (52,200) 
        = 3,132 
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Therefore, new jobs created per year for engineering = 3,132 
Step 7: Check the numbers 
Therefore, total accounted for = 16,152.987 + 3,132 
     ≈ 19,285 
Total unaccounted for = 20,816.2 – 19,284.987 
   ≈ 1,531 engineers (≈ 7.36%) 
Step 8: Calculate new jobs that would need to be created per year to yield 
unemployment for new entrants that is proportional to that for the field of engineering 
overall 
If we wanted unemployment for new entrants to reflect that for engineers 
 then, new jobs per year for engineers would need to = 20,816.2 – 2,248.1496 
        ≈ 18,568 
Therefore, engineering new jobs for university educated persons  
= (18,568.0504) / 0.6 
        ≈ 309,468 
Therefore, new jobs created per year would need to be = (309,467.51) / 0.12 
                ≈ 2,578,896 
Step 9: Apply results for study to overall graduating class of engineers in Egypt 
If we apply the migration intentions for work (77.5%) to the projected number of 
engineering graduates from public universities for 2011 in Egypt, we can visualize the 
effect migration could have on unemployment in Egypt. 
 
Applying results from question of interest in temporary work migration: 
 Engineering graduates leaving for work = 0.775 x (20,816.2) 
           ≈ 16,133 
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Engineering graduates remaining in Egypt = 20,816.2 (100% - 77.5%) 
       = .225 (20,816.2) 
       ≈ 4684 
Therefore, unemployed engineers remaining, based on these students migration 
intentions = 4683.6 – 3132 
  ≈ 1551 
Therefore, unemployment rate for new entrants into the field of engineering in Egypt 
following the migration of 77.5% of these new entrants as projected by the students’ 
intentions, would be: 
  = (1551.6 / 4683.6) x 100 
  = 31.128% 
Step 10: Calculate projections of changes needed to attain desired levels of 
unemployment 
While the above rate of unemployment that would result from the anticipated 
rate of migration of the students surveyed (31.128%) is significantly better than the 
82% currently seen for new entrants in unemployment statistics, it is still a 
worthwhile endeavor to calculate the rates of emigration that would be necessary, 
based on current predictions of market provision of positions for new entrants into the 
field of engineering (calculated here to be 3132), in order to have unemployment rates 
for new entrants be proportional to those of the field overall and in order to achieve 
0% unemployment. 
 
If goal is 10.8% unemployment for new graduates 
 then, unemployed = 4683.6 x (.108) 
    ≈ 506 
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then, necessary number of jobs for new entrants would be 
  4683.6 – 505.8288 ≈ 4178 
 This means that either job provision/creation would need to increase by 
  4177.7712 – 3132 = 1045.7712 
     = 33.39% increase 
 OR, emigration would need to increase by 
  ≈ 1046 persons emigrating 
  Therefore, total engineering graduates needing to leave for work 
  = 16,132.555 + 1045.7712 
  = 17178.326 or 17179 engineering graduates 
Therefore, necessary emigration rate to achieve 10.8% unemployment 
for new graduates based on current market provision of positions 
= 100 x (17178.326 / 20,816.2) 
= 82.52% 
This indicates that an increase of 5.02% is needed from current 
migration intentions among new entrants 
If goal is 0% unemployment 
 then job provision needs to increase by 
 4483.6 – 3132 ≈ 1552 
   = 49.54% increase 
 OR, emigration would need to increase by 
  ≈ 1552 persons emigrating 
  Therefore, total engineering graduates needing to leave for work 
  = 16,132.555 + 1551.6 
  = 17,684.155 or 17,685 engineering graduates 
51 
 
Therefore, necessary emigration rate to achieve 0% unemployment for 
new graduates based on current market provision of positions 
  = 100 x (17684.155 / 20,816.2) 
  = 84.95% 
This indicates that an increase of 7.45% is needed from current 
migration intentions among new entrants 
 
It is important to point out that, based on these results, the student intentions 
seem to indicate a reasonable level of awareness, meaning that their migration 
intentions meet the realities of the local labor market they are entering. The fact that 
the intentions of near-graduates do show such an overwhelming desire to work abroad 
and the more striking fact that these intentions might in fact be what is ideal under the 
present market conditions in Egypt clearly indicates that the domestic environment is 
not conducive to alleviating traditional fears of losses from skilled emigration. This 
may, however, be a blessing in disguise for Egypt in the short-run as the domestic 
market appears incapable of absorbing the skilled persons stretching the demand for 
unavailable positions.  
In 2006, the average male graduate from engineering faculties in Egypt took 
approximately two years to find gainful employment, with about 50% needing this 
amount of time, and an additional 25% found employment within the first five years 
following graduation. These numbers have improved from their levels in 1998 when 
50% employment rates for the class was reached three years after graduation and 75% 
took nearly eight years to attain. For women, the remarkably low rate of incorporation 
into the market has remained constant with less than 25% of female students joining 
52 
 
the workforce even after 15 years99. The disjointed reality of education and 
employment in Egypt is further exemplified by the non-existence of graduate 
assistance for employment at public universities across the country. Even in private 
universities, only two offer career services for their students and alumni100. This 
signals the presence of the additional hurdle for students who are approaching a 
difficult market with no sense of what limited options it has to offer. 
The IMIS project discussed above is one model that could be adopted 
nationally, bilaterally or multilaterally, as a way of connecting the prospective 
applicant pool with positions needing their qualifications. Not only would such a 
method aid in the amelioration of the perpetually increasing unemployment rate for 
nationals with tertiary education, it would also facilitate the creation and retention of 
ties with recent graduates for the Egyptian government. Domestically, by becoming 
the portal through which recent graduates are placed in private or public sphere 
positions, the Egyptian government will more easily be able to track trends in 
graduate employment and market demand. This information can then be used to better 
prepare university students for the real market and not an idealized version of what it 
might provide.  
Internationally, by facilitating coordination between its own nationals and 
foreign states, the government can preemptively protect its nationals from the dangers 
of illegal forms of migration (which only 10% of the present sample said they might 
consider) as well as strengthen the accuracy of its own data on and ties with its 
diaspora. Furthermore, by ensuring that it keeps in contact with its nationals abroad, 
the Egyptian government will have a better understanding of the skills its nationals 
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are acquiring abroad, and will consequently be better prepared for the imminent return 
of a large majority of these immigrants. 
The next chapter will consider some of the gains often discussed in the 
literature on emigration, all of which would be strengthened by increased ties with 
and support from the Egyptian government. The chapter will address remittances as 
one benefit stemming from the emigrants while abroad, and follow with possible 
gains arising from return migration. 
 
4. IS EGYPT FACING A NET GAIN OR NET LOSS? 
4.1 Remittances 
 The stability of remittances, as will be discussed, has proven to be reliable in 
the MENA region, but how far-reaching the effects of the remittances themselves will 
be in terms of contribution to development once in the migrant sending country 
largely depends on the situation in the home country101.  
The economic environments that encourage out-migration also limit the 
potential for migrant remittances to stimulate development in migrant sending 
areas. Poor market infrastructure, particularly in rural areas from which many 
migrants come, discourages the production of goods for markets. Incomplete 
or missing credit markets in migrant sending areas make it difficult to harness 
remittances for local investment, and they force migrant households to 
perform the dual function of being agents both of migration and of 
investment.102 
 
Low incomes, productivity levels and domestic policies yielding high inflation, risk 
and economic uncertainty further hinders the potential gains that could come from 
emigrants’ remittance sending patterns103. Domestic government policy in the migrant 
sending states, which will be discussed below, thereby carries much of the obligation 
to rectify its own policies to most effectively be able to harness the productive 
potential of this significant source of income. 
One aspect of economic development that is often said to be greatly influenced 
by emigrant remittances, is income inequality in the migrant sending country and on 
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the global level. Looking nationally first, remittances are said to increase income 
inequality in the sending area thereby creating a self-perpetuating cycle where 
deprived households will continue to send members abroad hoping to obtain the 
remittance income from their emigration104. The effect felt within the sending country 
can vary, but is particularly interesting in the case of Egypt whose Gini coefficient 
rises by 24.5% when remittances are factored into calculations of per capita 
household income, meaning that income inequality increases dramatically when 
remittances are included. Richard Adams explains that this occurs due to the 
distribution of which quintile of society is producing and maintaining the largest 
number of migrants abroad. He states that the poorest quintile in Egyptian rural 
society is producing a proportional amount of migrants, but that the wealthiest 40% of 
the population is producing a disproportionately large number of migrants, while the 
middle strata are under-producing migrants. This means that the upper 40% is 
receiving remittances from a larger amount of people, which he claims is where the 
difference lies between the social strata, and not in the migrants’ earnings abroad or in 
their likelihood to remit105. While clearly a legitimate concern, this macro level look 
at the effect of emigrant remittances on the population can also be considered in a 
different light. 
After instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international migration, 
and controlling for level of income, income inequality and geographic region, 
results for the poverty headcount measure suggest that, on average, a 10% 
increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s population will 
lead to a 2.1% decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per 
person per day. After instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of 
international remittances, a similar 10% increase in per capita official 
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international remittances will lead, on average, to a 3.5% decline in the share 
of people living in poverty.106 
Picturing population income shifts in this manner would illustrate that while the gap 
between social strata has been exacerbated, the common denominator is now in a 
higher place indicating an overall increase in the income levels of the population as a 
whole. 
 On a global scale however, emigration is notably assumed to lead toward a 
convergence of income and wages between capital-rich and capital-poor countries107. 
In turn, “well-functioning markets for capital, credit, insurance, and futures emerge” 
lessening the desire of nationals to emigrate. Once these institutions become well-
established the state becomes incorporated as a developed capitalist state in the global 
economy. This process, which has traditionally taken approximately eight or nine 
decades to complete, may be more accelerated in recent years generating changes in 
the country’s migration patterns enabling it to now be a net-importer of labor rather 
than a net-exporter108. 
4.1.1 Historically 
Oftentimes, brain “mobility bolsters a developing country’s ability to attract 
global investment and trade linkages”109. Countries in the MENA region, including 
Egypt, Jordan and Turkey continue to utilize emigration as part of their economic 
strategies110.  
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The Egyptian government experimented with a range of policies to exploit this 
resource but with little success. From 1964 Egyptians were allowed to hold 
foreign currency accounts in Egyptian banks and were initially obliged to 
repatriate a proportion of their income: 25% for single people, 10% for those 
with families. This proved unsuccessful and exchange rates were altered in 
1968 and 1972 in an attempt to encourage remittances. By the end of the 
1970s, the government had begun to issue bonds for Egyptians abroad as a 
way to tap their income for development investment. None of these policies 
led to significant growth of access to remittances by official sources. 
Fluctuations in remittances clearly relate to the unpredictable nature of 
movements which are disruptive for migrants and make it very difficult to plan 
based on future remittance transfers.111 
While such a strategy could potentially be viewed as risky, the reliance of 
countries in the region on remittances sent back as part of their economic strategy has 
notably proven to be sustainable and secure source of finance, even in times of 
economic hardship for the host countries112. Comparing the statistics from the mid-
1990s to current remittance data demonstrates the stability surprisingly stemming 
from this voluntary form of economic assistance. 
In 1995, Egypt received $4.7 billion in remittances, nearly equaling the $6 
billion in combined revenues brought in by oil exports, tourism and Suez Canal 
receipts113. The previous year Egypt was one of the top five remittance receiving 
countries that accounted for approximately one third of global remittances114.  
In the fiscal year 2003–2004 the remittances of Egyptian expatriates amounted 
to $2.999 billion. The US ranked top among the countries from which 
Egyptians abroad send their remittances with $1.111 billion. Saudi Arabia 
ranked second with $951 million, followed by the United Arab Emirates with 
$278 million, and Germany with $131 million.115  
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Present day data shows the MENA region as the third largest recipient of 
remittances globally, receiving 18% of global remittances116. In 2007, the MENA 
region received approximately $28.5 billion in remittances, with Egypt leading the list 
of recipients with $ 5.9 billion received117. Patterns of remittance by state of origin 
differ, yet have shown to also be consistent over time. Moroccans have been found to 
remit proportionally irrespective of their host state. Egyptians on the other hand, 
“remit massively from the USA, Gulf states and Europe; and proportionately very 
little from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, Canada and Greece”118. 
 Yet, despite seemingly permanent stays in the host country, one explanation 
given for these continued remittances is the “return illusion”119 that keeps emigrants 
tied to their home countries despite the slim likelihood that they will return home.  
By sending members abroad to work, households diversify their labor 
portfolios to control risks stemming from unemployment, crop failures, or 
commodity price fluctuations. Engaging in foreign labor also permits 
households to accumulate cash for large consumer purchases or productive 
investments, or to build up savings for retirement. Whereas the rational actor 
posited by neoclassical economics takes advantage of a geographic 
disequilibrium in labor markets to move abroad permanently to achieve higher 
lifetime earnings, the rational actor assumed by the new economics of labor 
migration seeks to cope with market failures by moving overseas temporarily 
to repatriate earnings in the form of regular remittances or lump-sum 
transfers.120 
Most sending and host countries view the circular migration trend as positive as long 
as the length of time that the emigrant remained outside his or her own borders was 
sufficient to offset the costs of his or her departure. If the migrant were to stay for a 
short period of time abroad, one benefit to the sending state would arise from limiting 
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the social cost of having a missing member in the nuclear family, yet such a decision 
to return too promptly would exaggerate the proportional cost of the decision to 
migrate. However, the desire to return promptly is an indication of the strength of the 
ties remaining with the sending state, thereby translating into more secure remittance 
sending patterns121. 
Once received, remittances contribute to the local economies of the home 
countries both at the micro and macro levels. In his study, Adams found that simply 
receiving remittances increased the propensity of a family to invest122. While direct 
evidence of remittance expenditure patterns is hard to find for the Middle East, 
evidence suggests that the funds for this region are allocated comparably to those 
received in the Mediterranean and Mexican cases. The latter regions utilize the funds 
coming from remittances largely on consumption, namely “improved food, clothing, 
housing and household effects. The economic impact of such spending varies from 
country to country, but in general only the last two kinds of spending seem to be of 
the labor-intensive employment-generating type”123. Data on remittance sending to 
Morocco, Algeria and Egypt indicates the same spending pattern on consumption, 
while highlighting that in the Egyptian case the propensity to consume is no higher in 
remittance receiving families than it is in non-migrant-sending families124. Spending 
on consumer goods for the remittance receiving families may seem like a short-
sighted decision, but given the often difficult saving infrastructure and the need for 
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immediate enhancement of a family’s standard of living, such decision are, at the 
micro level, immediately logical and should be anticipated125. 
 That is not to say however that spending on consumption goods negates the 
benefits of remittances on the larger national economy of the migrant sending state. 
Most directly, consumption goods, especially those pertaining to housing, food, 
education and health care, have the immediate effect of enhancing productivity in the 
migrant sending state. The extent to which such increased productivity will have a 
lasting impact largely depends on the structure of the remittance receiving state126. 
Increased consumption will also have a multiplier effect in the economy as the 
increased demand for goods and services will reinvigorate local business and generate 
new demand for local manufactured goods127, providing that the remittances are not 
used to increase imports128. More indirectly, remittances received in the migrant 
sending states from their emigrants aid at the macro-economic level by alleviating 
exchange constraints that are often faced by developing countries, providing sending 
state nationals with access to foreign currency and bolstering domestic savings 
through those families who despite any infrastructural obstacles are still able to 
save129. Migrant sending households often also experience positive effects on income 
as the steady flow of remittances provides them with risk-free access to capital 
encouraging them to make economic contributions to local production that were 
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previously unattainable. Regular market interaction would then further extend the 
reach of the remittances to non-migrant sending households130. 
4.1.2 Remittance Intentions for this Sample Set 
While emigrant remittances have been shown to enhance standard of living 
and positively influence demand for local market goods, the true developmental 
impact can only be assessed when balanced against the loss experienced due to the 
emigration of the migrant131. In order to make such an assessment, many of the 
factors discussed above would need to be taken into account. In states where the labor 
supply exceeds the labor demand in a particular sector, the emigration of a national 
that particular field, whether skilled or unskilled, would serve the development 
purposes of the migration sending state. This is in large part due to the lack of 
productive contribution this national would have otherwise made if they had not 
emigrated. While this national may have contributed to the local economy as a 
consumer, by emigrating and then remitting this now-emigrant is able to maintain his 
or her level of consumption spending, via their home network’s use of the fund
remitted on consumption goods, while also likely being able to contribute more to th
national economy through the potential savings arising from the remaining 
remittances. 
in 
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 In states however where the emigrant was able to work, the opportunity cost of 
their departure must be calculated in terms of their current and projected productive 
and economic contribution in their line of work. This must then be compared to the 
emigrant’s current and projected earnings abroad, and the anticipated percentage as a 
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portion of (potentially increasing) compensation that he or she expects to remit. Based 
on this remittance amount, the economic contribution in consumption and in 
productive investment of the remittance receiving household should be estimated. 
This last step would likely prove to be the most challenging as intended spending 
patterns may over-emphasize the productive use of the funds remitted while 
downplaying the receiving household’s intended expenditure on consumption goods. 
However, comparable real expenditure patterns could be scrutinized to determine how 
far the remittance receiving household’s intentions are from what tends to occur in 
reality. The final assessment of the economic contribution arising from remittances 
sent by the emigrant can then be compared to what his or her productive contribution 
to the labor market would have been had he or she stayed thereby determining 
whether this particular migrant’s decision to leave was beneficial or detrimental to the 
economic development of the sending state.  
Applying this logic to the target sample of students for this survey aids in the 
analysis of their anticipated remittance patterns. When asked what they expect their 
salaries to be following graduation, student responses ranged from 800 EGP/month to 
10,000 EGP/month. The average salary expectation was 2,530 EGP/month, while the 
median answer was 2000 EGP/month, and the most listed salary expectation was 
3000 EGP/month, followed closely by 2000 EGP/month. A marked difference arises 
when these results are compared for male and female respondents, as the female 
respondents anticipate salaries that are on average 500 EGP/month lower than those 
projected by the male students for their work in Egypt. Female students’ expectations 
average around 2,120 EGP/month and do not exceed 3000 EGP/month. There is also 
a noticeable difference in salary expectations depending on the student’s familial 
income level, as students from the highest income bracket expect almost twice as 
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much on average as those from the <1000 bracket, while students in the middle 
income brackets expect to earn amounts that hover right around the overall average of 
responses. 
When asked the same question in terms of expectations if they were to work 
abroad, students listed salaries ranging from 2000 EGP/month on the lower end to 
55,000 EGP/month on the higher. The mode in the students’ listing of salary ranges 
abroad was 10,000 EGP/month, with an average of 12,540.70 EGP/month. Here again 
we find that there is a clear difference in the expectations of male and female students, 
with an average difference of almost 3000 EGP/month where female students project 
salaries abroad to range from 3000-30,000 EGP/month, with less than a third of 
female respondents listing salary expectation abroad higher than 6000 EGP/month. 
77.3% of respondents who intend to work abroad or emigrate said that they 
intend to remit part of their salary. Persons who reported that their household income 
fell below 3000 EGP/month were 20% more likely to have the intention to remit than 
persons whose income exceeded this amount, however the percentages of students 
from all income brackets aiming to remit some portion of their income is notably 
high. Of these a quarter were unsure of how much they intended to remit, with some 
specifying simply that they will use what they need and send the remainder home, 
while the remaining 75% specified amounts ranging from 10 to 90 per cent of their 
wages, with the average falling just under 34%. Of the women who plan to remit, only 
one specified a percentage of her salary (35%) while the rest said they did not know.  
 Based on their salary expectations, we can calculate what the potential 
imagined remittance amount from this graduation class will be. If the 77.3% who plan 
to remit while abroad, whose average expectation for compensation while abroad was 
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12,540 EGP/month, do in fact do so, their total remittances would equal 291,788.175 
EGP/month (53,530.2741 USD/month132)133. The amount remitted is therefore 
slightly higher than the sum of the salary expectations the students listed for work in 
Egypt if they were to remain which add up to 263,155 EGP/month (48,277.35 
USD/month). The difference between the sum remitted and the sum earned at home 
will widen even further as the latter amount decreases as the engineer, or family unit, 
utilizes this income for their livelihoods, as compared to the remittances which 
represent a net amount that was dispensable and which can be used in the full by the 
recipients. 
Interestingly, in the responses from CU females, none noted sending money 
home as part of the reason they intend to emigrate. This further plays into the country 
context of this emigration decision as Egypt predominantly sends its single young 
men abroad, while a woman emigrating is less likely to be the primary breadwinner 
for any family unit and more likely to be married, therefore she will be less likely to 
remit as she will be traveling as part of the family unit. 
4.2 Gains from Return Migration 
4.2.1 Skills acquired 
Another criticism that arises when considering the region’s dependence on 
remittances for economic stimulus addresses migrants from the Middle East who do 
return to their country of origin. Oftentimes they return overseas after finding that 
they are unable to maintain the lifestyle to which they have become accustomed 
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following the depletion of their savings134. This cyclical pattern of movement, while 
seemingly detrimental to the sending states, can serve the latter by curbing the effect 
of lower remittance sending generally associated with skilled migrants135 by 
harnessing their presence in their home country in the form of information sharing. 
This in turn raises the labor force’s proficiency via technology, methods or training 
that may not have otherwise been available in the migrant sending country.  
[A] recent study (Moomaw et. al, 1999) found that when physical and human 
capital is taken separately to measure the influence on growth, the results [for 
the aggregate Knowledge Economy Index and the GDP per capita] are 
positive, but not statistically significant. However, when all the forms of 
capital (physical, human, and knowledge) are included, the results are positive 
and significant. Specifically, the output elasticity of this broader concept of 
capital when considered within a Cobb-Douglas framework is 0.485. This 
means that a change of 1% in capital results in an increase of 0.485% in the 
level of economic output.136 
Using a revisionist approach to looking at migration, the prospect of skilled 
demand and future employment abroad for higher wages and better conditions is also 
said to serve as an incentive for nationals in the sending state to strive for higher 
levels of education. In turn, if migration trends do not call upon all of the newly 
educated nationals of the sending country to work abroad, the sending state’s resulting 
levels of education are increased and the home country benefits even without having 
taken into account the remittance patterns of those who have left or their potential 
return home137. In a study of a representative global sample of 33 countries, Adams 
found that less than 10 percent of those with tertiary education in sending countries 
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migrated to the United States or the OECD countries138. One study found that 
increased demand for migrants with tertiary education will lead to an increase in 
secondary school enrollment, thereby enhancing interest in education in the sending 
country139. Additionally, the circular nature of migration means that fears of brain 
drain should be more accurately considered brain mobility140, whereby a migrant’s 
knowledge is in reality being shared by both the host country, where the migrant is 
likely refining the skills and bolstering his or her human capital, and the home country 
to which a migrant might choose to return, even temporarily, sharing some of the 
newly acquired skills and lessons with co-nationals in the sending state. This therefore 
would indicate, that while a “brain” might not immediately and directly contribute to 
productivity domestically if it migrates, the mobile nature inherent to circular 
migration results in this “drain” not constituting a net loss for the sending state as 
frequent access by the sending state to the human and social capital accrued enables it 
to share in the same “brain’s” capacities. 
4.2.2 Job Market 
While the direct impact of skilled migrants’ return into the Egyptian job 
market must be considered in terms of increased skill level and capabilities of the 
market to absorb and benefit from these new levels, return emigration generates a 
different type of stimulus for the home market as well. In analyses done by Barry 
McCormick and Jackline Wahba on return migrants in the Egyptian market, results 
showed that skill acquisition was not the only added benefit to be reaped from 
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returnees. Levels of savings, coupled with the human capital brought back, impacted 
entrepreneurship among returnees, as did region of origin. Since we clearly cannot 
predict the propensity to save while abroad of the surveyed students for this study, 
area of origin and interest in entering into public or private work will be applied to the 
trends found by McCormick and Wahba to attempt to predict the potential market 
contributions of these students. The current sample is composed primarily of urban 
students, with the vast majority (nearly 90%) having been raised in urban Egypt and 
intending to live in urban areas if they remain in Egypt. This would mean that nearly 
30.6% of this study’s total sample may return to Egypt without savings as “36% of 
rural-origin and 30% of urban-origin returnees were unable to make any savings at 
all”141. Savings on their own however will not influence the sample population’s 
likelihood of investment quite as much as it might other broader populations as 
educated returnees are influenced by both savings and human capital acquisition142. 
Keeping savings constant, returnees who spent a longer period of time abroad (an 
average of 4.3 years as compared to 2.4 years) and noted that they have acquired 
useful skills during their time abroad are much more likely to invest in non-farm 
enterprises143.  According to the predictions of students sampled for this study, nearly 
half of those who intend to return to Egypt after some time abroad intend to do so 
after having spent more than 4 years abroad, which might indicate a high likelihood 
(nearly 45%) that students from this graduating class will contribute to Egypt’s 
economy via entrepreneurial projects.  
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The share of returnees’ enterprises engaged in services activities is twice that 
of stayers. On the other hand, non-migrants’ enterprises tend to be 
concentrated in trade activities. The proportion of returnees’ enterprises in 
manufacturing is about the same as that of non-migrants: 28% compared to 
26%.144 
 
In general, returnees found to invest in non-farm enterprises have been found 
to have higher levels of education than those investing in agricultural projects, yet the 
majority of such projects are founded in rural areas145. Therefore, in this sample 
population it would be interesting to find out upon their return, whether the migrants 
with higher levels of education who do choose to return to rural areas opt to invest in 
agricultural or non-farm enterprises.  
Furthermore, there is a shift in the market distribution of returnees among the 
private and public sectors following their migration. Slightly less than a third of those 
employed in the public sector prior to migration return to public enterprise, with one 
third entering into private sector employment146. Employment characteristics within 
each sector also change as there is a 9% increase, from 10% to 19%, in the number of 
employers among the sample population post-migration. This increase is felt most in 
urban settings where the share quadruples, as compared to the 50% increase 
experienced in rural areas147. As employers, returnees generally account for 15 
percent of the capital invested in a small enterprise, thereby also being responsible for 
generating 15% of the associated employment, equaling approximately 1.5 more jobs 
per enterprise than do stayers generate148. While returnees are just as likely to employ 
informal workers who do not pay into social security, the overall quality of the jobs 
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created by returnees, both for formal and informal employees, is deemed higher in 
terms of allowing for paid leave, for example. Although returnees do utilize the 
informal labor market for their employee pool, 76% of returnee firms follow proper 
procedure and pay taxes on their earnings and 80% have licensed or registered their 
enterprise, as compared to 67% and 74% of stayer firms respectively149.
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5. STEPS FORWARD 
Without simply reducing each student, potential migrant or not, to an 
economic unit and acknowledging that beyond purely monetary evaluations, there are 
social and political reasons to choose emigration, the following is a discussion of 
policies that can be used by sending states to better harness gains that could stem from 
their citizens’ migration choices..  
5.1 Existing Policies on Emigration 
The state’s influence on the impact and potential productivity generated from 
emigration, both in terms of promoting higher education and training and in relation 
to the possible economic contributions arising from migrant remittances, has been 
discussed in the preceding chapters. Without the proper reinforcement and enabling 
infrastructure in the home country, it would be practically impossible for emigration 
to have far-reaching positive effects. It would likely still influence household level 
changes in educational desires and standard of living, but it would be a waste for 
migrant sending countries’ governments not to implement necessary methods, some 
of which will be discussed in this chapter, to maximize the gains accessible from their 
existing emigration patterns. 
Egypt’s strategy as a sending country to promote emigration that was noted 
earlier is utilized “as part of broader strategies to acquire foreign exchange, reduce 
unemployment, and develop skills”150. Egyptian Emigration Law no. 111, discussed 
earlier, has put forth regulations to attempt to further harness the potential 
developmental gains that could arise from the large sums being remitted back into 
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Egypt every year. Since remittance income constitutes approximately 21 percent of 
foreign investment within Egypt151,  the law aims to address infrastructural fears that 
may lead migrant families to shy away from investing within the country. The law 
notes migrant rights to sponsorship and grants exemptions from taxes and fees on the 
returns earned by emigrants on their deposits in Egyptian banks. Furthermore, 
“migrants’ capital utilized in investment projects in Egypt is to be granted the same 
advantages granted to foreign capital152. Other sending states aim to slow the 
integration of their nationals in the host country so as to ensure continued remittances 
without needing to rely on encouraging emigration of their nationals153. Based on the 
remittance intentions for the class in question for this study, the Egyptian government 
would benefit greatly from strengthening ties with migrants prior to their departure 
and facilitating the flows of funds from this diaspora to their country of origin. 
Furthermore, if one is to assume that the migration intentions of future classes of 
graduates from Egyptian universities will exhibit the same trends as the sample class, 
then the government would not stand to benefit from slowing the integration of their 
nationals abroad as, based on the intentions identified in this study, intentions to 
emigrate prevail among recent graduates thereby meaning that Egypt will have a 
replenishing source of remitting migrants. 
5.2 Domestic Policy Discussion 
Just as the movement of labor internationally is guided by foreign demand and 
domestic surplus, the incongruity evident within the Egyptian labor market and its 
unemployment patterns can be rectified through re-adjustment of skills based on 
domestic needs assessments. Egyptian Minister of Manpower and Emigration 
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recommends the use of vocational training centers and post undergraduate re-
education as tools to stimulate the reallocation of labor force resources 
domestically154. According to the International Labour Organization, 
Skills development should be understood as one of the elements of the 
virtuous circle, within which we have high wages, high productivity, and high 
development. Identifying the virtuous circle as the target, or end goal, the 
policies enacted in its pursuit serve 3 main objectives: 
• Matching supply and demand of skills, and to expand availability of 
training to more people so that they can benefit from economic growth 
• Maintaining the employment of workers through re-skilling and 
lifelong learning 
• Building up capabilities to sustain a dynamic development process, 
using education and training policies to boost technological change, 
investment, diversification and competitiveness.155 
 
The government has begun promoting these much needed market shifts by 
simultaneously addressing two potential hindrances to attaining its goals. The first is 
the cultural undercurrent that fuels the desire to ‘save face’ and gain prestige by 
working within certain industries, such as medicine, pharmacy and engineering, 
which the government is targeting through its “Train Campaign,” a campaign working 
to promote the idea that it does not matter where one graduated from, it matters that 
one is employed156. This campaign also aims to educated people and train them to 
enter into positions in the private sector. Ironically, in this sample population, 67.3% 
of the students noted that they preferred to work in private companies, while 31% 
would work in either public or private companies. The second obstacle to market 
labor force re-allocation is the need for training conducive to effective reorganization. 
“The government sponsored Social Development Fund has invested in over 700 new 
trade trainees to retrain the Egyptian labor force; upgraded 152 vocational trading 
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centers; and produced 38 new curricula”157. The SDF also invests in capacity building 
through micro-credit programs for small and medium size enterprises, to encourage 
informal enterprises to enter into the formal economy158.  
In addition to skill development and increased investment spending, Egypt can 
benefit from catering to international market demands in ways beyond emigration by 
meeting foreign demands through domestic services. The Egyptian Minister of 
Communications and Technology proposes the “Development of Export Oriented IT” 
by which he intends to cater to foreign needs through the creation of Egypt as a 
resource pool and base for outsourcing activities needed by companies around the 
world. In this way, he foresees attracting ICT investment and foreign direct 
investment, which in turn will assist in achieving the ministry’s set goals of sustaining 
an annual growth rate of 20% and increasing job provision in this particular sector by 
about 20,000 in three years159. This would contribute a perceptible increase in the 
number of positions for new entrants into the labor market each year, particularly if 
foreign states necessitate outsourced support rooted in technology, as this would mean 
that the employable “export oriented” persons would need to be pulled from 
engineering graduates, and this would in effect double the provision of positions for 
these graduates each year. Linking the IT industry domestically with international 
needs would also facilitate knowledge sharing and technology exchange160. 
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5.3 International Policy Discussion 
5.3.1 Promoting Circular Migration 
The presence of a strong diaspora in certain receiving states can serve as a 
lobby for migrant interests and home country interests on a global scale. A strong 
diaspora can also implement more formal methods, such as that noted above, of 
information sharing to enhance collaboration between their two homes in science and 
technology, and diffuse new strategies used in trade and management161. These types 
of policies however, being spurred by the diaspora would prove to be largely 
inefficient if the home country’s government does not put an equal stake in advancing 
its own technology to efficiently be able to implement incoming shared knowledge162. 
The IOM advocates the notion of circular migration for the dissemination of 
professional skills and methods. This type of migration pattern enables the sending 
country to harness the professional productive abilities of its diaspora while 
alleviating fears holding the migrants back from returning to their home countries 
associated with working conditions and standard of living. Advocating the use of 
circular migration enables persons originating from one country to return to this 
country, whether through a state-sponsored program or on their own, for a short 
period of time during which they can teach or apply their lessons learned while abroad 
in their home country. This option is particularly enticing for migrants who do not 
feel that their home country offers a professional environment that they are willing to 
reenter, but who still wish to contribute to the its advancement. In order to 
successfully utilize circular migration for the benefit of both the sending and receiving 
countries, both governments must implement certain practices. 
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These include, for receiving countries: visa regimes, student fee levels, 
networking with sending countries, and ethical and controlled recruitment 
campaigns. For sending countries, taxation and human rights problems are 
clear disincentives, and R&D priorities, incentives not only to return but also 
to attract expatriate investments, along with other issues of economic growth 
and development are essential. This approach is emphasised systematically in 
the two UNDP Arab Human Development Reports, as well as the World Bank 
regional employment report (World Bank, 2004a) and other IOM reports on 
emigration and remittances.163 
Such circular migration would also be most useful in situations where the emigrant 
has formed a family abroad as it would enable him or her to maintain some form of 
stability in their new life while also keeping their ties with their home country strong. 
 Some sending governments in the hopes of promoting permanent repatriation, 
have considered offering assistance programs as an incentive for their expatriate 
nationals to return. These programs can be all-encompassing including offers 
covering transportation costs of the emigrant, his or her family and their belongings. 
Some also include transportation of any relevant equipment and insurance offers. Yet 
despite some countries’ use of such extreme measures to lure nationals back in, 
evidence has shown that these financial incentives take a back seat to the expatriates’ 
expectations of workable infrastructure. Additionally, they are often quite expensive 
and inefficient at encouraging mass repatriation, and could cause problems between 
the nationals and the returning expatriates who may be viewed as receiving unfair 
privileges164. Despite the gains to the returning emigrants of accepting such incentive 
packages, the use of circular migration still seems the more plausible option as it 
provides the migrant sending country with the gains associated with brain mobility 
while alleviating the pressure off the sending government to make such provisions 
allowing the latter to then commit more of its resources to building the needed 
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technological infrastructure that would enable the country to best utilize the new 
shared knowledge. 
5.3.2 Harnessing Remittance Flows 
The proposed support for circular migration additionally allows the emigrant 
to maintain strong ties with their sending state, and therefore by encouraging circular 
migration and providing the economic atmosphere to harness its gains, emigrants will 
be more likely to continue to remit. Migrant sending government policy should 
directly address remittances and seek assistance from the international community to 
reduce the high costs associated with sending remittances. Such global policies would 
not only encourage increased remittance sending and alleviate the taxing effect that 
the current high costs create, but it would also encourage the use of formal remittance 
channels which in turn would aid the global community in understanding the true 
effect of emigrant remittances on the home country165.  
Facilitating the use of formal channels through which funds can be remitted 
will also enable sending governments to securitize the remittances, or, in other words, 
to utilize the guarantee of consistent future money flows, based on the historical flows 
they can now monitor, to “extend loans by the local banks for productive purposes, 
[and to] pass on interest savings from the remittance securitization to its customers 
and offer longer term loans on new products”166. Enhanced access to banking and the 
formalization of remittance flows is a key goal of several international organizations, 
including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, who hope such 
measures will alleviate poverty and ameliorate access to financial services for people 
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in poor areas of developing countries. A benefit of securitizing these remittances 
would be the ability to more accurately quantify the direct effect monies remitted 
have on household investment decisions and long-term economic adjustment within 
the country. By keeping closer track of the investment patterns of migrant families 
before and after the migration of one of their members, the home country government 
can better understand what the immediate needs of families are based on how they 
spend their additional funds, and can begin to provide channels for nationally 
constructive uses of these supplementary funds. 
Prime among the means found to formalize remittances is the establishment, 
or strengthening, of migrant-sending countries’ economic policies by establishing an 
effective banking system and an appropriate exchange rate167. Simultaneously, 
reducing the cost of access to formal remittance networks, including banks and other 
transfer systems, would likely be a more expedient and efficient method of 
formalization than any attempt to formalize all available informal routes. 
Reducing formal remittance costs, in turn, can be accomplished with 
regulatory changes such as: (1) allowing and encouraging domestic banks to 
operate in countries where migrants are employed to overcome migrant 
distrust of banks and ensure that banking services are provided in the migrants' 
language (in some cases, capital requirements need to be reduced for transfer 
agents as well); (2) discouraging or banning exclusive arrangements between 
transfer agents such as Western Union or Moneygram and entities with 
dispersed facilities in migrant areas of origin such as postal agencies, thus 
ensuring competition in the so-called "last mile" of a remittance corridor; and 
(3) encouraging the spread of cell-telephone based remittance transfer 
systems, since this promises the lowest cost and remitters and remittance 
receivers can use the cell telephones for other purposes as well.168  
This latter method of reducing costs has been proven effective in several other sectors 
by extending access to information systems to remote areas without requiring the 
heavy investment in infrastructure that was previously necessary. In February 2007, 
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Mastercard in conjunction with the GSM Association proposed a plan that would send 
money from one SIM card to another via Mastercard’s transaction networks to 
facilitate the use of cellular technology in remittance sending169. With only one-third 
of the world’s population having easy access to banking services and 2.5 billion 
phones being used around the world170, if the idea to leverage this technology for use 
in formalizing remittances did catch on, better estimates of remittance patterns could 
be formulated and the true impact of remittances on their recipients could begin to be 
analyzed. 
5.3.3 Consider the Option of Taxation 
Whether migration constitutes a net brain drain for the sending country or a 
brain gain for the receiving country blurs an already unclear line between rights of the 
migrant sending and migrant receiving state over a migrant’s labor, knowledge and 
wealth. The topic of taxation, although fairly uniformly applied as a right of the 
country of residence, deserves further scrutiny as it falls squarely within the gray area 
of mixed state possession. “Until the early seventies, Egyptians working abroad were 
obliged to transfer to Egypt in a free currency a certain proportion (normally 25 
percent) of their incomes”171, yet, and despite the growth of the numbers of Egyptians 
heading to Arab states for work in that decade, the practice is no longer utilized 
meaning that there exists in the Egyptian diaspora a large portion of Egyptians who do 
not pay taxes anywhere. 
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On the polar extreme, the threat of dual taxation172 for citizens of one state, 
residing in and perhaps becoming citizens of, another is what complicates the 
applicability of policies regarding the taxation of emigrants. These migrants’ situation 
places them in a position where they may show allegiance to two countries 
simultaneously, for example by paying taxes in their host country while maintaining 
political ties in the other.  
[P]rofessional migrants retain their national status and associated rights, 
including often the right to vote, but carry no corresponding tax obligation, even 
of a minimal nature. The situation is one of “representation without taxation.” 
The anomaly is particularly compounded because typically these highly skilled 
migrants are among the more prosperous and successful even prior to their 
migration, and their ability to work abroad renders them the more taxable, and 
almost totally untaxed, citizens of their countries. When one considers that in 
Albert Hirchman’s apt conceptualization, these migrants have chosen to “exit” 
but have retained “voice” and “loyalty,” it appears legitimate to regard their 
escaping the tax system as altogether incongruous. (Bhagwati, 1979 [1983, pp 
63-64]).173   
The source country thereby not only loses individuals who may have been able to 
contribute quite productively within their home country, but it has also allowed them 
to maintain the same rights afforded to any of their citizens174. In effect, the taxation 
scheme as it exists in most countries does not distinguish between persons emigrating 
and persons traveling for a short period in the rights they can access upon their return 
to their home country. The United States is one of the few states, and is the only 
advanced country, to apply a tax on its emigrant population that has surpassed a 
certain wage cap abroad. The justification for such taxation by the United States of its 
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citizens would seem to address precisely the dilemma underscored by Bhagwati’s 
concern over “representation without taxation,” in that the U.S. bases its taxation 
scheme on citizenship rather than residence175. In this way, it is able to tax its citizens 
around the world for the benefits they reap by carrying this citizenship, in lieu of 
holding them only accountable when within the state borders. 
While this is a logical approach, if applied incorrectly taxation based on 
citizenship and not residence could lead to the creation for a call for double taxation. 
Several fears arise however from such a call. Nonresident citizens give up some of 
their claims to services that only home-based nationals can access, such as roads, 
healthcare services and public education, yet they also may need to access resources 
that would be of no use to persons within their own territory. Citizen migrants 
maintain the right to access personal protection, property protection, right to vote and 
the right to enter. They also might have benefited in the past from state resources that 
will now not provide gains for the state that provided them. One example that arises 
here is the use of public schooling by a citizen preceding their departure from the 
country. Would it be justifiable for the state to factor in its expenditure on education 
for the 34.2% of our present sample who attended a public primary school, and/or the 
40.5% and 58.4% who did so for their preparatory and secondary years respectively to 
calculate taxes owed? Could the state also attach a value to its expenditure on private 
schooling? 
If the idea of taxation is based on what the state believes it is owed, then the 
room for abuse of taxation by malintentioned states would be too high for this 
recommendation to work. Conversely, qualifying state collection of nonresident 
                                                 
175 Michael S. Kirsch, "Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy," New York Law Review 82 (2007). 
81 
 
citizens’ taxes with exceptions to ensure that precautions are taken, by all countries, to 
circumvent the issues of double taxation, by accounting for differences in each 
migrant’s situation in terms of how much they would have paid in taxes in their host 
country, how much they are currently paying and how much the cost of living will 
enable them to pay, would likely serve to lessen apprehension regarding the 
imposition of the tax176, although this process would prove cumbersome and 
ineffective if not coordinated through an international body to ensure synchronicity 
across all host and destination countries. The United Nations General Assembly, in its 
meeting to discuss “High-level international intergovernmental consideration for 
financing development” in 2001, did recommend emigrant taxation and emphasized 
the need for an International Tax Organization to lead monitoring and coordination of 
taxation, as one way to provide some redress for the sending countries177. 
Another suggestion put forth to avoid criticism for double taxation is to word 
regulations mandating an emigrant income tax in a way that allows for migrants to 
renounce their citizenship if the terms are not acceptable to them178. Having seen that 
91% of students intend to return to Egypt following a short period of time abroad, it 
would be hard to imagine that a renunciation of their Egyptian citizenship would be a 
path of interest. This ultimatum, while clearly a direct challenge to the home 
country’s government to utilize the funds from taxes received in an acceptable manner 
for fear of losing its ties to the Egyptian diaspora, might not be very effective in this 
situation as the renunciation of home in itself does not appear to be a plausible option 
for migrants from Egypt who would likely not use such a measure to hold their 
government accountable for the direction the tax monies collected travel.  
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The idea that a state would benefit through taxation from the loss of many of 
its most talented minds seems flawed since the internal development that is desired 
through the generation of this additional source of income could stagnate when faced 
with infrastructure that has not caught up with what is needed to properly utilize 
incoming funds. Therefore this policy recommendation cannot be used independently, 
but must be coupled with a diversified approach that will bolster infrastructural needs 
in Egypt and also ensure that funds are funneled appropriately into projects and/or 
areas where they are most needed and through which potential developmental, social 
and economical, gains will be maximized.   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The policy discussion here, it should be noted, considers emigration 
retroactively and must be supplemented with systemic and societal changes that will 
simultaneously address the existing trends in unemployment patterns in Egypt and 
encourage the strengthening of ties among the diaspora, and between the Egyptian 
diaspora and Egypt. For example, by working to harness remittance monies, or 
highlighting the value added to the market by return migrants through their 
contribution of skills and additional jobs in the market, Egypt is able to benefit from 
the migration of its skilled minds; however, by merely aiming to benefit in retrospect 
from the decision of its migrants, Egypt, as a sending state, is not sufficiently 
scrutinizing the intention of its nationals to emigrate.  
 The research discussed here illustrates that the migration intentions in the student 
population sampled is not negligible and, if it is found to be reflected beyond this 
survey’s target population, could affect Egyptian population dynamics so fundamentally 
as to alter the demographic constitution of future generations, particularly if 
disenchantment with the home state leads migrants to choose to remain abroad for longer 
periods of time or even permanently. The guiding dynamics that lead to a student’s 
decision to choose to migrate emerge even before the student is born as the societal 
reinforcement of what a family’s desirable expectations for this new born should be 
inevitably influence the manner in which the child is raised to think about education and 
future opportunities. 
That public higher education in Egypt is based primarily on matching the most 
desired areas of study with the highest scoring high school graduates perpetuates a 
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never-ending cycle whereby the highest scores are associated with only a limited 
number of university degrees. Therefore, even if a high school graduate is not 
interested in a particular field of study, if he/she earns a high score in the national 
“thanaweya” (final high school) exams, it has become socially objectionable to forego 
applying for these select few prestigious majors, namely medicine, engineering, 
pharmacy and political sciences and economics, among others. This, in turn, generates 
fresh graduates in particular fields whose scores on the national entrance exams were 
disproportionately high as compared to other fields of study, as opposed to generating 
graduates in each field with a proper bell curve representation including a portion of 
the brightest high school students, a large majority of students who earned average 
scores and a few who did not do as well. While such a bell curve might develop 
among the university students themselves, it still could not be juxtaposed (when 
considering the national high school exam scores) across different faculties to show 
an even distribution of high schools’ brightest minds across disciplines of study at the 
university level. Where the bell curve ends for one major of study might be where 
another begins, meaning that the latter fields of study and, by extension, its dependent 
industry is not set up for success from the very beginning. While one cannot make the 
assumption that all those earning high scores are necessarily distributed among a few 
top majors in the top universities, as some may not face or might be able to evade 
pressures to conform, the current reality does dictate that all those in those top majors 
at the top universities are high scorers since they all have to have met the minimum 
acceptance scores. Rectifying such deeply seeded societal impressions of what is best 
can only be possible if the issue is addressed from the top with education for the 
general public about market realities and the harm that arises out of unwarranted 
concentration in particular industries, as well as from the bottom with an educational 
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system that promotes independent thought, which would enable students to recognize 
where their interests truly converge and lead them to choose the proper field based on 
this recognition. 
The problem of socially dictated educational aspirations is compounded when 
it is considered in light of the present research, as the concentration of the brightest 
minds in a few particular areas of focus leads to the over-saturation of the market and 
the creation of high levels of unemployment for graduates from these prestigious 
faculties. Therefore, not only has the ‘prestige’ mentality led to disadvantaging full 
industries, but it also then contributes to an amplification of the problems of 
unemployment and skilled emigration.  
One way of resolving some of the adverse effects of emigration is the “win-
win strategy” proposed by Chouri (1997). This strategy recognizes individual 
initiative in emigration and the government’s role as a facilitator of individual 
initiative. However, the “win-win strategy” is a utopian situation in which all 
parties in the game are expected to gain from the exchange. If the strategy 
were to work, it would involve the regions or parties concerned seeking 
maximization of employment opportunities for workers, skill enhancement 
and other management strategies. And in cases where the maximum cannot be 
achieved, the strategy holds ways of reducing the gap in such a way that there 
would be mutual benefits for all parties. The strategy is, therefore, thought-
provoking as a way of resolving the dilemma posed by ill-integrated 
consequences that offer little or no gain to the source or destination regions.179 
Contemplating emigration with the aim of creating a win-win strategy is necessary 
both domestically and internationally, as discussed earlier. Domestically, working to 
balance skills with need is the clear first step. Domestic policy can also contribute in 
win-win thinking in terms of recognizing the realities facing the country. As we 
discussed that 82% of recent graduates find it impossible to enter into the market upon 
graduation, and even after 5 years, only about 75% successfully do, domestic policies 
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aimed specifically at those left to live in the lag between education and employment 
would prove most efficient. If the migration intentions, for example, of recent 
graduates are gauged and funneled into effective placements abroad for the first few 
years following graduation, then the government of Egypt would benefit its own 
country in the short-run by lessening the rates of unemployment, industry-wide and 
for new entrants, and benefit from the ripple effects of human and social capital 
accumulation, as discussed earlier, gained while abroad by the return migration of the 
students after their set placements abroad. Realistically, the short-run implementation 
of such a strategy would need serious consideration in terms of how best to 
incorporate the returnees following their ‘training’ period abroad as the market may 
be faced with the same overwhelming demands for entry a few years after the students 
graduate. In the long-run however, this strategy may prove to be sustainable as the 
conditions, both logistical and infrastructural, should be in place that will facilitate the 
placement of students in positions in which expertise will be necessary upon their 
return. 
 This strategy clearly would require international cooperation of the sort used 
in the IMIS project discussed earlier to succeed and to best offer the opportunity for 
all parties involved to ascertain the level at which mutual cooperation will best yield 
the most valuable win-win situation. If assessed within existing views on international 
migration, security concerns would weigh heavily against permitting emigration in 
many industrialized countries180, and therefore, without first addressing such 
concerns, a situation that might be a win for the receiving country may not 
comprehensively constitute a win for the sending country. Efforts by the government 
on the international front should strive to generate bilateral and multilateral 
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agreements that would enable intending migrants from Egypt to find gaps within 
foreign markets to fill, and that would encourage these foreign countries to turn to 
Egypt first as needs emerge. In order to accomplish such a feat and confidently be 
able to sell Egyptian graduates as the best candidates for open positions, the system of 
higher education within Egypt should continue to expand its provision of accredited 
schools and improve the level of tertiary education in existing universities to earn 
accreditation and facilitate entrance into foreign job markets for its recent graduates. 
While solely utilizing the Maghreb and Mashrek states to alleviate market woes in 
Egypt was noted earlier to be the least plausible option, if the creation of an “Arab 
Economic Citizenship Area,” 181 for example, were supplemented with agreements 
with the European Union and any other states whose market supply needs 
reinforcement, the situation could prove to be a definite win for Egypt, and ideally for 
the host states as well.  
6.1 Future Research 
 In order to determine whether the efforts the Egyptian government would need 
to expend to secure agreements as recommended above would be worthwhile, this 
study first needs to be expanded to provide a representative assessment of the 
migration intentions of all students graduating from university across Egypt. This 
would allow researchers to evaluate which industries are most likely to be affected by 
emigration and which labor markets are most strained, in terms of either too many or 
too few new entrants each year. Feasibility studies delving into labor market needs in 
popular countries of destination and labor market generation in Egypt could also 
benefit potential discussion to create mutually beneficial agreements as these would 
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be based on realities of the market and not on illusions of possibilities from either 
party. 
Furthermore, future research would benefit from the perspectives of Egyptians 
abroad across countries of destination and fields of employment to see whether their 
intentions to remit and to return reflect the same patterns as the intentions of students 
who plan to migrate. Research with nationals abroad could also gauge the realities of 
expenses by country of destination and income; the reasons migrants would or would 
not choose to return; and the strength of their relationship with the Egyptian 
government so as to provide the home government with a basis from which to begin 
its work to ameliorate its relationship with the diaspora. 
In addition to cross-country, single-point-in-time studies of Egyptian migrants, 
discussions with nationals abroad and domestically could provide the basis for an 
interesting longitudinal study whereby not only are student intentions at a single point 
in time compared with the realities experienced by their demographic counterparts 
abroad at the same point in time. Their intentions could be tracked every few years for 
several decades to determine whether the destination choices, financial costs and 
gains, remittance patterns and duration of expatriation matched the intentions when 
the subjects were students. 
 Further scrutiny of return migration would also benefit this field of study. A 
contemporary study on the real activities of return migrants and any obstacles that 
emerge in their attempts to return would benefit Egypt as a case study by enabling the 
country to create policies based on realistic expectations of gains accrued from the 
emigration of its nationals.
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY ANSWERS FOR CAIRO UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF 
ENGINEERING CLASS OF 2010 
 
Table 2 - Respondent Gender 
Gender سنجلا 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Male رآذ 78.9% 90 
Female ىثنأ 21.1% 24 
answered question 114 
skipped question 1 
 
 
Table 3 - Respondent Marital Status 
Marital Status  ةيعامتجلاا ةلاحلا 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Never Married  جاوزلا كل قبسي مل 99.1% 113 
Married  جوزتم/ةجوزتم  0.9% 1 
Widowed  لمرأ/ةلمرأ  0.0% 0 
Divorced  قلطم/ةقلطم  0.0% 0 
Separated  لصفنم/ةلصفنم  0.0% 0 
answered question 114 
skipped question 1 
 
 
Table 4 - Respondent Religion 
Religious Affiliation ةنايدلا 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Muslim ملسم/ةملسم  88.6% 101 
Christian يحيسم/ةيحيسم  11.4% 13 
Other ىرخأ ةنايد 0.0% 0 
answered question 114 
skipped question 1 
 
 
 
109 
 
Table 5 - Other Citizenships 
Do you have any other citizenships? ؟ىرخأ تايسنج لمحت له  
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes معن 2.7% 3 
No لا 97.3% 108 
answered question 111 
skipped question 4 
 
 
Table 6 - Pre-University Schooling 
Pre-University Schooling ةعماجلا لبق اميف ةيساردلا لحارملا 
Answer Options 
Public 
School 
ةماع ةسردم 
Private 
School 
ةصاخ ةسردم 
Response 
Count 
Where did you attend primary school? ةيئادتبلإا ةلحرملا 38 73 111 
Where did you attend preparatory school? ةيدادعلإا ةلحرملا 45 66 111 
Where did you attend secondary school? ةيوناثلا ةلحرملا 66 47 113 
answered question 113   
skipped question 2 
  
 
 
Table 7 - Languages Spoken 
Which languages do you speak? (Check all that apply)  ام لآ رتخإ ؟اهثدحتت يتلا تاغللا يه ام
قبطني 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Arabic ةيبرعلا 99.1% 112 
Chinese ةينيصلا 0.0% 0 
English ةيزيلجنلإا 95.6% 108 
French ةيسنرفلا 25.7% 29 
German ةينامللأا 8.8% 10 
Greek انويلاةين  0.0% 0 
Italian ةيلاطيلإا 0.9% 1 
Japanese ةينابيلا 0.0% 0 
Spanish ةينابسلأا 0.0% 0 
Other (please specify  ىرخأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  0.0% 0 
answered question 113 
skipped question 2 
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Table 8 - Engineering Concentration 
Which field of engineering are you studying? ؟هسردت يذلا ةسدنهلا عرف وهام 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Architectural ةيرامعملا 19.1% 21 
Civil ةيندملا 10.9% 12 
Electrical ةيئابرهكلا 29.1% 32 
Mechanical ةيكيناكيملا 26.4% 29 
Computer رتويبمكلا 3.6% 4 
Chemical ةيئاميكلا 3.6% 4 
Petroleum لورتبلا 0.9% 1 
Aerospace ناريطلا 0.0% 0 
Biomedical ةيبطلا 6.4% 7 
Please specify your concentration صصختلا ديدحت ءاجر 44 
answered question 110 
skipped question 5 
 
 
Table 9 - Household Income 
What is the total monthly income in your household in LE?  لحم يف يرهشلا لخدلا عومجم وه ام
؟يرصملا هينجلاب كتماقإ 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
< 1000 18.8% 19 
1000-3000 31.7% 32 
3000-7000 30.7% 31 
7000-12000 8.9% 9 
> 12000 9.9% 10 
answered question 101 
skipped question 14 
 
 
Table 10 - Employment Status 
Do you currently work? ؟ايلاح لمعت له 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 95.6% 108 
Yes (Please specify your current position   معن) ديدحت ءاجر
ةيلاحلا ةفيظولا 4.4% 5 
answered question 113 
skipped question 2 
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Table 11 - Current Means of Financial Support 
How do you currently support yourself? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟ايلاح كسفن لوعت فيآ 
Gender سنجلا 
    
Answer Options Male رآذ Female ىثنأ Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Work لمع 4 0 3.6% 4 
Family Support يرسأ معد 86 24 98.2% 110 
Savings تارخدم 11 0 9.8% 11 
Scholarship ةيسارد ةحنم 1 0 0.9% 1 
Other (please specify  ىرخأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  0 0 0.0% 0 
answered question 112 
skipped question 2 
 
 
Table 12 - Means of Financial Support Following Graduation by Gender 
How will you support yourself following graduation? (Check all that apply)  دعب كسفن ةلاعإ يونت فيآ
رتخإ ؟ جرختلا قبطني ام لآ  
Gender سنجلا 
    
Answer Options Male رآذ Female ىثنأ Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Work لمع 88 24 100.0% 112 
Family Support يرسأ معد 5 0 4.5% 5 
Savings تارخدم 8 1 8.0% 9 
Other (please specify  ىرخإ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  1 0 0.9% 1 
answered question 112 
skipped question 2 
 
 
Table 13 - Means of Financial Support Following Graduation by Income Bracket 
How will you support yourself following graduation? (Check all that apply) 
 ني ام لآ رتخإ ؟ جرختلا دعب كسفن ةلاعإ يونت فيآقبط  
What is the total monthly income in your 
household in LE?  يف يرهشلا لخدلا عومجم وه ام
؟يرصملا هينجلاب كتماقإ لحم     
Answer Options < 1000 1000-3000 
3000-
7000 
7000-
12000 > 12000 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Work لمع 14 26 23 9 7 100.0% 79 
Family Support يرسأ معد 0 0 1 1 3 6.3% 5 
Savings تارخدم 0 0 5 1 0 7.6% 6 
Other (please specify  ىرخإ
)ديدحتلا ءاجر  0 0 1 0 0 1.3% 1 
answered question 79 
skipped question 1 
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Table 14 - Private or Public Employment Desired 
Do you intend to work for a public or private company? ؟ةصاخ ما ةماع ةآرش يف لمعلا يونت له 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Public ةماع 1.8% 2 
Private ةصاخ 67.3% 76 
Either Private or Public عون يأ 31.0% 35 
answered question 113 
skipped question 2 
 
 
Table 15 - Previous Employment Outside Egypt 
Have you ever worked outside Egypt before? ؟لبق نم رصم جراخ لمعلا كل قبس له 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 92.1% 105 
Yes (Please specify where  معن)لا ديدحت ءاجرناكم  7.9% 9 
answered question 114 
skipped question 1 
 
 
Table 16 - Expected Domestic Compensation 
How much would you expect to earn as an engineer in Egypt upon graduation?  بسكت نأ عقوتت مآ
؟جرختلا دعب رصم يف سدنهمآ   
Answer Options Response Average 
Response 
Total 
Response 
Count 
Anticipated Salary in LE/month  عقوتملا بترملا
يرصملا هينجلاب 2,530.34 263,155 104 
answered question 104 
skipped question 11 
 
 
Table 17- Intention to Work Abroad in the Future by Gender 
Do you intend to work abroad in the future? ؟ لبقتسملا يف جراخلاب لمعلا يونت له 
Gender سنجلا 
    
Answer Options Male رآذ 
Female 
ىثنأ 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 9 16 22.7% 25 
Yes (Please specify where  معن)ناكملا ديدحت ءاجر  77 8 77.3% 85 
answered question 110 
skipped question 4 
113 
 
Table 18 - Offer of Employment Abroad 
Do you already have an offer to work abroad? ؟لعفلاب جراخلاب لمع ضرع كيدل له 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 82.7% 91 
Yes معن 17.3% 19 
answered question 110 
skipped question 5 
 
 
Table 19 - Expected Compensation Abroad 
How much would you expect to earn as an engineer abroad?  سدنهمآ بسكت نأ عقوتت مآ
؟جراخلاب 
Answer Options Response Average 
Response 
Total 
Response 
Count 
Expected Salary in LE/month  عقوتملا بترملا
يرصملا هينجلاب 12,540.70 1,078,500 86 
answered question 86 
skipped question 29 
 
 
Table 20 - Intention to Emigrate in the Future by Gender 
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the future? ؟لبقتسملا يف رصم نم ةرجهلا يونت له 
Gender سنجلا 
    
Answer Options Male رآذ 
Female 
ىثنأ 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, this year ماعلا اذه للاخ ،معن 2 0 1.8% 2 
Yes, in 1-2 years نينثا وأ ماع للاخ ،معن 18 1 17.4% 19 
Yes, in 3-5 years ماوعأ ةسمخ ىلإ ةثلاث للاخ ،معن 25 1 23.9% 26 
Yes, in 6-10 years ماوعأ ةرشع ىلإ ةتس للاخ ،معن 3 0 2.8% 3 
Yes, but I don’t have concrete plans yet  ،معن
دعب ةددحم ططخ يدل سيل نكل 14 5 17.4% 19 
No, I do not intend to emigrate ةرجهلا يونأ لا ،لا 23 17 36.7% 40 
answered question 109 
skipped question 5 
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Table 21 - Intention to Return Following Time Abroad 
If you intend to work abroad or to emigrate, do you intend to return to Egypt 
permanently after some time abroad? إةرجهلا وأ جراخلاب لمعلا يونت تنآ اذ،  رصم ىلإ ةدوعلا يونت له
؟جراخلاب تقولا ضعب ءاضق دعب 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 9.3% 9 
Yes (Please specify how long you expect to stay abroad 
 معن)جراخلاب اهءاضق عقوتملا ةدملا ديدحت ءاجر  90.7% 88 
answered question 97 
skipped question 18 
 
 
Table 22 - Intention to Return Following Time Abroad by Expected Departure Timeframe 
If you intend to work abroad or to emigrate, do you intend to return to Egypt permanently after 
some time abroad? ةرجهلا وأ جراخلاب لمعلا يونت تنآ اذإ، ؟جراخلاب تقولا ضعب ءاضق دعب رصم ىلإ ةدوعلا يونت له  
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the 
future? ؟لبقتسملا يف رصم نم ةرجهلا يونت له     
Answer Options 
Yes, 
this 
year 
 ،معن
 للاخ
 اذه
ماعلا 
Yes, 
in 1-2 
years 
 ،معن
خ للا
 وأ ماع
نينثا 
Yes, in 
3-5 
years 
 للاخ ،معن
 ىلإ ةثلاث
 ةسمخ
ماوعأ 
Yes, in 
6-10 
years 
 ،معن
 للاخ
 ىلإ ةتس
 ةرشع
ماوعأ 
Yes, but 
I don’t 
have 
concrete 
plans 
yet  ،معن
 سيل نكل
 ططخ يدل
دعب ةددحم 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 0 3 4 0 1 11.9% 8 
Yes (Please specify how long you 
expect to stay abroad  معن) ءاجر
جراخلاب اهءاضق عقوتملا ةدملا ديدحت 
2 15 22 3 17 88.1% 59 
answered question 67 
skipped question 3 
 
 
Table 23 - Intention to Remit 
If you plan to work abroad or emigrate, do you plan to send money back to Egypt 
during your time abroad? ةرجهلا وأ جراخلاب لمعلا يونت تنآ اذإ،  رصم يف كيوذل لااومأ لاسرإ يونت له
؟جراخلاب كدوجو ءانثأ 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 22.7% 20 
Yes (Please specify a percentage you plan to send back 
home  معن(كيوذل اهلاسرأ يونت يتلا ةبسنلا ديدحت ءاجر 77.3% 68 
answered question 88 
skipped question 27 
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Table 24 - Intention to Remit by Income Bracket 
If you plan to work abroad or emigrate, do you plan to send money back to Egypt during your time 
abroad? ةرجهلا وأ جراخلاب لمعلا يونت تنآ اذإ، ؟جراخلاب كدوجو ءانثأ رصم يف كيوذل لااومأ لاسرإ يونت له  
What is the total monthly income in 
your household in LE?  عومجم وه ام
؟يرصملا هينجلاب كتماقإ لحم يف يرهشلا لخدلا     
Answer Options < 1000 
1000-
3000 
3000-
7000 
7000-
12000 
> 
12000 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 1 2 8 2 2 19.7% 15 
Yes (Please specify a percentage you 
plan to send back home  معن) ديدحت ءاجر
كيوذل اهلاسرأ يونت يتلا ةبسنلا 
9 22 18 6 6 80.3% 61 
answered question 76 
skipped question 25 
 
 
 
Table 25 - Reasons for Emigration 
What are the main reasons you want to emigrate? (Check all that apply)  بابسأ مهأ يه ام
قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟كيدل ةرجهلا 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
To make a higher income ربآأ لخد بسكل 68.8% 53 
To send money home كيوذل لاومأ لاسرلإ 10.4% 8 
To get training and return ةدوعلا مث بيردتلل 28.6% 22 
To live outside Egypt رصم جراخ شيعلل 24.7% 19 
Bad living conditions in Egypt  ةشيعملا لاوحأ ءوسلرصم يف  49.4% 38 
To join family already outside Egypt  نيدوجوملا لهلااب قاحلل
رصم جراخ 2.6% 2 
To escape from family pressures and troubles  نم بورهلل
تلاكشم وأ ةيلئاع طوغض 9.1% 7 
There are no job opportunities in Egypt  لمع صرف رفوت مدعل
رصم يف 27.3% 21 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ بابسأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  20.8% 16 
answered question 77 
skipped question 38 
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Table 26 - Reasons for Emigration by Gender 
What are the main reasons you want to emigrate? (Check all that apply) ابسأ مهأ يه ام ةرجهلا ب
قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟كيدل 
Gender سنجلا 
    
Answer Options Male رآذ 
Female 
ىثنأ 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
To make a higher income ربآأ لخد بسكل 50 3 69.7% 53 
To send money home كيوذل لاومأ لاسرلإ 8 0 10.5% 8 
To get training and return ردتللةدوعلا مث بي  19 3 28.9% 22 
To live outside Egypt رصم جراخ شيعلل 17 2 25.0% 19 
Bad living conditions in Egypt رصم يف ةشيعملا لاوحأ ءوسل 32 5 48.7% 37 
To join family already outside Egypt  لهلااب قاحلل
رصم جراخ نيدوجوملا 2 0 2.6% 2 
To escape from family pressures and troubles  نم بورهلل
تلاكشم وأ ةيلئاع طوغض 6 1 9.2% 7 
There are no job opportunities in Egypt  صرف رفوت مدعل
رصم يف لمع 17 4 27.6% 21 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ بابسأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  14 2 21.1% 16 
answered question 76 
skipped question 38 
 
 
Table 27 - Reasons for Emigration by Income Bracket 
What are the main reasons you want to emigrate? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟كيدل ةرجهلا بابسأ مهأ يه ام 
What is the total monthly income in your 
household in LE? وه ام  يف يرهشلا لخدلا عومجم
؟يرصملا هينجلاب كتماقإ لحم     
Answer Options < 1000 1000-3000 
3000-
7000 
7000-
12000 > 12000 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
To make a higher income ربآأ لخد بسكل 6 16 12 6 6 65.7% 46 
To send money home كيوذل لاومأ لاسرلإ 2 4 1 0 0 10.0% 7 
To get training and return ةدوعلا مث بيردتلل 1 7 7 4 3 31.4% 22 
To live outside Egypt رصم جراخ شيعلل 2 4 5 3 3 24.3% 17 
Bad living conditions in Egypt  لاوحأ ءوسل
رصم يف ةشيعملا 6 9 11 4 4 48.6% 34 
To join family already outside Egypt 
هلااب قاحللرصم جراخ نيدوجوملا ل  0 0 0 0 2 2.9% 2 
To escape from family pressures and 
troubles تلاكشم وأ ةيلئاع طوغض نم بورهلل 1 0 1 1 2 7.1% 5 
There are no job opportunities in Egypt 
رصم يف لمع صرف رفوت مدعل 2 5 8 2 2 27.1% 19 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ بابسأ)اجر ء
ديدحتلا 0 7 6 1 1 21.4% 15 
answered question 70 
skipped question 31 
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Table 28 - Prior Knowledge of Emigrants 
Do you know people who have emigrated already? (Check all that apply)  سانأ فرعت له
قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟لبق نم اورجاه 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, my parents ايدلاو ،معن 11.8% 13 
Yes, my brother يخأ ،معن 1.8% 2 
Yes, my sister يتخأ ،معن 2.7% 3 
Yes, a member of my extended family  دارفأ نم درف ،معن
ةعسوملا يترسأ 49.1% 54 
Yes, a friend يل قيدص ،معن 51.8% 57 
No, I don't know anyone who has emigrated  فرعأ لا ،لا
رجاه ادحأ 20.9% 23 
answered question 110 
skipped question 5 
 
Table 29 - Intent to Join Past Emigrants 
If you know people who have already emigrated, are you planning on going to one of the 
countries where they are? ؟اهيلإ اورجاه يتلا لودلا ىدحإ ىلإ باهذلا يونت له ،اورجاه سانأ فرعت تنآ نإ 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
I do not know anyone who has emigrated already  فرعأ لا
لبق نم رجاه ادحأ 13.7% 10 
No, I do not plan to go to the same country  باهذلا يونأ لا ،لا
ةلودلا سفن ىلإ 27.4% 20 
Yes, I plan to go to the same country (Please specify the 
country/countries  ةلودلا سفن ىلإ باهذلا يونأ ،معن) ديدحت ءاجر
ةلودلا/لودلا   
58.9% 43 
answered question 73 
skipped question 42 
 
Table 30 - Pull Factors 
What draws you to your country of destination? (Check all that apply)  ىلإ كبذجي يذلا ام
قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
I have friends there كانهءاقدصأ يدل 10.5% 8 
I have relatives there كانه براقأ يدل 23.7% 18 
I have a job offer there كانه لمع ضرع يدل 18.4% 14 
I want to live in that country ةلودلا هذه يف شيعأ نأ بحأ 51.3% 39 
More job opportunities there كانه رثآأ لمعلا صرف 53.9% 41 
My destination is less crowded and/or polluted  لقأ يتهجو
اثولت وأ اماحدزإ 31.6% 24 
I could study there كانه ةساردلا يننكمي 43.4% 33 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ بابسأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  9.2% 7 
answered question 76 
skipped question 39 
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 Table 31 - Source of Information about Destination 
What is your source of information about your country of destination? (Check all that 
apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا نع كتامولعم ردصم وهام 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Friends/Relatives ءاقدصأ/براقأ  71.2% 52 
Internet تنرتنلإا 57.5% 42 
Egyptian Authorities ةيمسر ةيرصم رداصم 5.5% 4 
Personal Research يصخش ثحب 37.0% 27 
Media (TV/Radio/Newspapers  ملاعلإا)نويزفلت/ويدار/دئارج  30.1% 22 
Embassy of the Receiving Country  ةرافسةدوصقملا ةلودلا  11.0% 8 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ رداصم)ديدحتلا ءاجر  4.1% 3 
answered question 73 
skipped question 42 
 
 
Table 32 - Persons Assisting in Migration 
Are there persons who will help you migrate? (Check all that apply)  كدعاسيس نم كانه له
قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟ةرجهلل 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Relatives in your destination country  يتلا ةلودلا يف براقأ
اهدصقت 30.4% 21 
Relatives in Egypt رصم يف براقأ 18.8% 13 
Egyptian Friends in your destination country  ءاقدصأ
اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا يف نييرصم 20.3% 14 
Non-Egyptian Friends in your destination country  ءاقدصأ
اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا يف نييرصم ريغ 5.8% 4 
Friends in Egypt رصم يف ءاقدصأ 8.7% 6 
Migration Brokers ةرجه ءاطسو 23.2% 16 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ)ءاجر ديدحتلا  17.4% 12 
answered question 69 
skipped question 46 
 
 
Table 33 - Expected Cost of Migration 
What do you expect is the cost of migrating? ؟ةرجهلا ةفلكت نوكت نا عقوتت مآ 
Answer Options Response Average 
Response 
Total 
Response 
Count 
Expected cost in LE يرصملا هينجلاب ةعقوتمملا ةفلكتلا 25,641.30 1,179,500 46 
answered question 46 
skipped question 69 
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 Table 34 - Do you have Savings for Use in Migration 
Have you saved up money to use for your emigration? ؟ةرجهلل اهمادختسا دصقب لااومأ ترخدإ له  
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 91.7% 66 
Yes (Please specify in LE  معن)يرصملا هينجلاب ديدحتلا ءاجر  8.3% 6 
answered question 72 
skipped question 43 
 
 
Table 35 - Other Means of Financial Assistance for Migration 
Are there others financially assisting you in your emigration? (Check all that apply)  له
قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟ةرجهلل ايلام كدعاسي نم كانه  
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, a member of my immediate family  دارفأ نم درف ،معن
ةرشابملا يترسأ 63.0% 46 
Yes, a member of my extended family  دارفأ نم درف ،معن
ةعسوملا يترسأ 9.6% 7 
Yes, friend/friends قيدص ،معن/يل ءاقدصأ  1.4% 1 
Yes, people from my neighborhood/village  نم صاخشأ ،معن
ةريجلا/ةيرقلا  0.0% 0 
No, no one is assiting me financially ايدام يندعاسي دحأ لا ،لا 32.9% 24 
If yes (Please specify in LE  معنب تبجأ اذا)يرصملا هينجلاب ديدحتلا ءاجر  1 
answered question 73 
skipped question 42 
 
 
Table 36 - Acceptable Positions Abroad 
Do you intend to work as an engineer abroad, or will you accept a position in another 
industry? ؟ رخآ لاجم يف لمعلا لوبق كنكمي مأ ،جراخلاب سدنهمآ لمعلا يونت له 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Engineering positions only قف ةيسدنه فئاظوط  87.2% 68 
Any position abroad جراخلاب ةفيظو يأ 12.8% 10 
answered question 78 
skipped question 37 
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Table 37 - Completion of Equivalence Exams 
If you intend to work as an engineer, have you already completed any necessary 
equivalence exams for your destination country?  يأ تيرجأ له ،سدنهمآ لمعلا يونت تنآ نإ
؟اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا يف ةبولطم ةلداعم تارابتخإ 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, I have already completed the exams  تلمآأ دقل ،معن
لعفلاب تارابتخلإا 0.0% 0 
In progress يراج  اهب مايقلا 9.9% 7 
I will in the future اقحلا اهيرجأ فوس 74.6% 53 
No, I do not intend to يونأ لا ،لا 8.5% 6 
No, none are needed in my country of destination  تسيل ،لا
اهدصقأ يتلا ةلودلا يف ةبولطم 7.0% 5 
answered question 71 
skipped question 44 
 
 
 
Table 38 - Completion of Equivalence Exams by Expected Departure Timeframe 
If you intend to work as an engineer, have you already completed any necessary equivalence exams for 
your  
destination country? لا يونت تنآ نإ؟اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا يف ةبولطم ةلداعم تارابتخإ يأ تيرجأ له ،سدنهمآ لمع  
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the 
future? ؟لبقتسملا يف رصم نم ةرجهلا يونت له     
Answer Options 
 
 
Yes, 
this 
year 
 ،معن
 اذه للاخ
ماعلا 
Yes, 
in 1-2 
years 
 ،معن
 للاخ
 وأ ماع
نينثا 
Yes, in 
3-5 
years 
 ،معن
 للاخ
 ىلإ ةثلاث
 ةسمخ
ماوعأ 
Yes, in 
6-10 
years 
 ،معن
 للاخ
 ىلإ ةتس
 ةرشع
ماوعأ 
Yes, 
but I 
don’t 
have 
concret
e plans 
yet  ،معن
 سيل نكل
 ططخ يدل
دعب ةددحم 
Response 
Percent 
Respons
e Count 
Yes, I have already completed the 
exams تلمآأ دقل ،معن لعفلاب تارابتخلإا  0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
In progress يراج  اهب مايقلا 0 1 4 1 0 10.2% 6 
I will in the future اقحلا اهيرجأ فوس 2 14 16 2 12 78.0% 46 
No, I do not intend to يونأ لا ،لا 0 1 1 0 1 5.1% 3 
No, none are needed in my 
country of destination تسيل ،لا 
اهدصقأ يتلا ةلودلا يف ةبولطم 
0 0 3 0 1 6.8% 4 
answered question 59 
skipped question 11 
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Table 39 - Prior Knowledge of Emigrants by Expected Departure Timeframe 
Do you know people who have emigrated already? (Check all that apply)  ام لآ رتخإ ؟لبق نم اورجاه سانأ فرعت له
قبطني 
  
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the future? 
؟لبقتسملا يف رصم نم ةرجهلا يونت له   
Answer Options 
Yes, 
this 
year 
 للاخ ،معن
ماعلا اذه 
Yes, 
in 1-2 
years 
 ،معن
 للاخ
 وأ ماع
نينثا 
Yes, 
in 3-5 
years 
معن ،
 للاخ
 ةثلاث
 ىلإ
 ةسمخ
ماوعأ 
Yes, in 
6-10 
years 
 ،معن
 للاخ
 ىلإ ةتس
 ةرشع
ماوعأ 
Yes, 
but I 
don’t 
have 
concre
te 
plans 
yet  ،معن
 سيل نكل
 يدل
 ططخ
 ةددحم
دعب 
No, I 
do not 
intend 
to 
emigra
te  لا ،لا
 يونأ
ةرجهلا 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, my parents لاو ،معنايد  0 1 4 0 3 5 11.1% 8 
Yes, my brother يخأ ،معن 0 1 0 0 0 1 1.7% 1 
Yes, my sister يتخأ ،معن 0 1 1 0 1 0 2.6% 3 
Yes, a member of my 
extended family  نم درف ،معن
ةعسوملا يترسأ دارفأ 
0 9 15 1 11 16 44.6% 36 
Yes, a friend يل قيدص ،معن 2 16 13 2 11 12 48.0% 44 
No, I don't know anyone who 
has emigrated  ادحأ فرعأ لا ،لا
رجاه 
0 1 2 1 4 15 19.7% 8 
answered question 108 
skipped question 2 
 
 
Table 40 - Willingness to Resort to Irregular Modes of Migration 
How willing would you be to migrate illegally if a legal path to migration is unavailable? 
؟ةينوناق قرط كل رفوتت مل اذإ ةينوناق ريغ ةقيرطب ةرجهلل كدادعتسإ ىدم ام  
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Will definitely resort to illegal measures if a legal way is 
not available  رفوتت مل اذإ ةينوناق ريغ لئاسو ىلإ ديآأتلاب أجلأ فوس
ةينوناق قرط 
0.0% 0 
Very willing ادج دعتسم 1.3% 1 
Somewhat willing ءيشلا ضعب دعتسم 3.9% 3 
Very Reluctant ادج ددرتم 3.9% 3 
Will not resort to illegal measures if a legal path is not 
available إ أجلأ نلةينوناق قرط رفوتت مل اذإ ةينوناق ريغ لئاسو ىل  90.9% 70 
answered question 77 
skipped question 38 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C: SURVEY ANSWERS FOR PRIMARY UNIVERSITIES SAMPLED 
This Appendix provides the answers given to the survey questionnaire for the population of students reached from each of the primary 
universities sampled to illustrate whether the same patterns found in the Cairo University students are reflected in the overall student/recent 
graduate population, recognizing that this larger sample is not representative of the intentions of the overall student population at each of these 
universities. The overall sample reached by the researcher consisted of 442 students and recent graduates from universities across Cairo in 
addition to Alexandria University. Over half of the responses gathered were drawn from Cairo University, while another 15.8% came from Ain 
Shams, 16.3% from the American University in Cairo and 12.1% from Alexandria University. The answers from these four universities are 
given here, and account for 400 of the total number of responses. 
 
 
Gender سنجلا 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Male رآذ 159 47 39 50 74.1% 295 
Female ىثنأ 57 17 12 17 25.9% 103 
answered question 398 
skipped question 2 
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 Marital Status  ةيعامتجلاا ةلاحلا 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Never Married  جاوزلا كل قبسي مل 204 60 50 57 93.5% 371 
Married  جوزتم/ةجوزتم  11 3 1 10 6.3% 25 
Widowed  لمرأ/ةلمرأ  0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Divorced  قلطم/ةقلطم  0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Separated  لصفنم/ةلصفنم  1 0 0 0 0.3% 1 
answered question 397 
skipped question 3 
 
 
 
Religious Affiliation ةنايدلا 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Muslim ملسم/ةملسم  192 45 48 53 85.6% 338 
Christian يحيسم/ةيحيسم  21 18 3 14 14.2% 56 
Other ىرخأ ةنايد 1 0 0 0 0.3% 1 
answered question 395 
skipped question 5 
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What is the total monthly income in your household in LE? ؟يرصملا هينجلاب كتماقإ لحم يف يرهشلا لخدلا عومجم وه ام 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
< 1000 29 6 6 4 12.5% 45 
1000-3000 73 19 16 8 32.1% 116 
3000-7000 56 19 15 12 28.3% 102 
7000-12000 17 11 5 5 10.5% 38 
> 12000 18 4 4 34 16.6% 60 
answered question 361 
skipped question 39 
 
Pre-University Schooling ةعماجلا لبق اميف ةيساردلا لحارملا 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Count 
Where did you attend primary school? ةيئادتبلإا ةلحرملا 
Public School ةماع ةسردم 66 20 15 4   
Private School ةصاخ ةسردم 140 42 35 63   
  206 62 50 67 385 
Where did you attend preparatory school? ةيدادعلإا ةلحرملا 
Public School ةماع ةسردم 82 26 28 6   
Private School ةصاخ ةسردم 124 36 22 60   
  206 62 50 66 384 
Where did you attend secondary school? ةيوناثلا ةلحرملا 
Public School ةماع ةسردم 120 32 37 12   
Private School ةصاخ ةسردم 94 32 14 55   
  214 64 51 67 396 
answered question 396 
skipped question 4 
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Do you have any other citizenships? ؟ىرخأ تايسنج لمحت له  
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes معن 7 3 1 4 3.8% 15 
No لا 206 61 49 63 96.2% 379 
answered question 394 
skipped question 6 
 
 
Which languages do you speak? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟اهثدحتت يتلا تاغللا يه ام 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Arabic ةيبرعلا 213 62 50 65 99.2% 390 
Chinese ةينيصلا 2 0 0 0 0.5% 2 
English ةيزيلجنلإا 205 61 49 66 96.9% 381 
French ةيسنرفلا 65 22 8 25 30.5% 120 
German ةينامللأا 26 4 3 12 11.5% 45 
Italian ةيلاطيلإا 4 2 0 1 1.8% 7 
Japanese ةينابيلا 0 0 0 1 0.3% 1 
Spanish ةينابسلأا 3 0 1 1 1.3% 5 
Other (please specify  ىرخأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  1 0 0 3 1.0% 4 
answered question 393 
skipped question 7 
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Which field of engineering are you studying? ؟هسردت يذلا ةسدنهلا عرف وهام 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Architectural ةيرامعملا 26 4 0 2 8.2% 32 
Civil ةيندملا 16 9 0 12 9.5% 37 
Electrical ةيئابرهكلا 46 10 0 8 16.5% 64 
Mechanical ةيكيناكيملا 37 26 0 37 25.7% 100 
Computer رتويبمكلا 30 15 49 4 25.2% 98 
Chemical ةيئاميكلا 36 0 0 0 9.3% 36 
Petroleum لورتبلا 3 0 0 1 1.0% 4 
Aerospace ناريطلا 1 0 0 1 0.5% 2 
Biomedical ةيبطلا 15 0 0 1 4.1% 16 
Please specify your concentration صصختلا ديدحت ءاجر 169 
answered question 389 
skipped question 11 
 
 
Do you currently work? ؟ايلاح لمعت له 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 137 29 17 23 56.3% 206 
Yes (Please specify your current position   معن)ةيلاحلا ةفيظولا ديدحت ءاجر  67 26 30 38 44.0% 161 
answered question 366 
skipped question 34 
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What year did/will you graduate with your engineering degree? تلصح ةنس يأ يف/؟ةسدنهلا سويرولاكب ىلع لصحت فوس  
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
2004 1 3 0 2 1.6% 6 
2005 1 1 0 5 1.8% 7 
2006 3 0 2 7 3.1% 12 
2007 40 3 2 8 13.8% 53 
2008 6 13 17 6 10.9% 42 
2009 40 20 12 13 22.1% 85 
2010 115 11 12 8 38.0% 146 
2011 6 5 5 8 6.3% 24 
2012 1 3 0 3 1.8% 7 
2013 0 1 1 0 0.5% 2 
answered question 384 
skipped question 16 
 
How do you currently support yourself? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟ايلاح كسفن لوعت فيآ 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Work لمع 59 29 30 34 41.5% 152 
Family Support يرسأ معد 160 35 28 39 71.6% 262 
Savings تارخدم 21 5 0 7 9.0% 33 
Scholarship ةيسارد ةحنم 3 0 0 9 3.3% 12 
Other (please specify  ىرخأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  1 1 1 2 1.4% 5 
answered question 366 
skipped question 34 
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How will you support yourself following graduation? (Check all that apply) ت فيآقبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟ جرختلا دعب كسفن ةلاعإ يون  
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Work لمع 199 54 47 57 99.2% 357 
Family Support يرسأ معد 21 7 5 13 12.8% 46 
Savings تارخدم 16 4 2 9 8.6% 31 
Other (please specify  ىرخإ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  5 1 0 2 2.2% 8 
answered question 360 
skipped question 40 
 
Do you intend to work for a public or private company? ؟ةصاخ ما ةماع ةآرش يف لمعلا يونت له 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Public ةماع 4 2 3 1 2.8% 10 
Private ةصاخ 133 35 24 53 68.2% 245 
Either Private or Public عون يأ 65 17 17 6 29.2% 105 
answered question 359 
skipped question 41 
 
How much would you expect to earn as an engineer in Egypt upon graduation? ؟جرختلا دعب رصم يف سدنهمآ بسكت نأ عقوتت مآ   
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in 
Cairo 
Response 
Average 
Response 
Total 
Response 
Count 
Anticipated Salary in LE/month يرصملا هينجلاب عقوتملا بترملا 183 47 42 55 3,166.22 1,035,355 327 
answered question 326 
skipped question 74 
 
129 
 
Have you ever worked outside Egypt before? ؟لبق نم رصم جراخ لمعلا كل قبس له 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 180 46 42 51 87.9% 319 
Yes (Please specify where  معن)ناكملا ديدحت ءاجر  22 8 5 10 12.4% 45 
answered question 363 
skipped question 37 
 
Do you intend to work abroad in the future? ؟ لبقتسملا يف جراخلاب لمعلا يونت له 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 48 17 8 22 28.4% 95 
Yes (Please specify where  معن)ناكملا ديدحت ءاجر  141 29 33 36 71.6% 239 
answered question 334 
skipped question 66 
 
How much would you expect to earn as an engineer abroad? ؟جراخلاب سدنهمآ بسكت نأ عقوتت مآ 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Average 
Response 
Total 
Response 
Count 
Expected Salary in LE/month يرصملا هينجلاب عقوتملا بترملا 149 40 37 45 14,404.06 3,903,500 271 
answered question 271 
skipped question 129 
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Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the future? ؟لبقتسملا يف رصم نم ةرجهلا يونت له 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, this year لاخ ،معنماعلا اذه ل  8 3 0 3 4.2% 14 
Yes, in 1-2 years نينثا وأ ماع للاخ ،معن 24 8 8 10 15.1% 50 
Yes, in 3-5 years ماوعأ ةسمخ ىلإ ةثلاث للاخ ،معن 30 2 8 3 13.0% 43 
Yes, in 6-10 years ماوعأ ةرشع ىلإ ةتس للاخ ،معن 7 1 1 0 2.7% 9 
Yes, but I don’t have concrete plans yet دعب ةددحم ططخ يدل سيل نكل ،معن 36 13 12 11 21.7% 72 
No, I do not intend to emigrate ةرجهلا يونأ لا ،لا 82 19 14 29 43.4% 144 
answered question 332 
skipped question 68 
 
 
If you intend to work abroad or to emigrate, do you intend to return to Egypt permanently after some time abroad? ةرجهلا وأ جراخلاب لمعلا يونت تنآ اذإ،  له
؟جراخلاب تقولا ضعب ءاضق دعب رصم ىلإ ةدوعلا يونت 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 18 6 7 15 17.2% 46 
Yes (Please specify  معن)جراخلاب اهءاضق عقوتملا ةدملا ديدحت ءاجر  139 26 30 27 82.8% 222 
answered question 268 
skipped question 132 
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If you plan to work abroad or emigrate, do you plan to send money back to Egypt during your time abroad? ةرجهلا وأ جراخلاب لمعلا يونت تنآ اذإ،  لاسرإ يونت له
؟جراخلاب كدوجو ءانثأ رصم يف كيوذل لااومأ 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 37 8 8 29 32.0% 82 
Yes (Please specify a percentage you plan to send back home  معن)  109 23 27 15 68.0% 174 
answered question 256 
skipped question 144 
 
 
Do you know people who have emigrated already? (Check all that apply) لبق نم اورجاه سانأ فرعت لهقبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟  
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, my parents ايدلاو ،معن 19 5 7 4 10.5% 35 
Yes, my brother يخأ ،معن 7 5 2 2 4.8% 16 
Yes, my sister يتخأ ،معن 4 3 0 1 2.4% 8 
Yes, a member of my extended family ةعسوملا يترسأ دارفأ نم درف ،معن 93 20 23 34 51.1% 170 
Yes, a friend يل قيدص ،معن 97 21 18 37 52.0% 173 
No, I don't know anyone who has emigrated رجاه ادحأ فرعأ لا ،لا 42 8 6 6 18.6% 62 
answered question 333 
skipped question 67 
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If you know people who have already emigrated, are you planning on going to one of the countries where they are?  ىدحإ ىلإ باهذلا يونت له ،اورجاه سانأ فرعت تنآ نإ
؟اهيلإ اورجاه يتلا لودلا 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
I do not know anyone who has emigrated already لبق نم رجاه ادحأ فرعأ لا 14 2 4 1 12.1% 21 
No, I do not plan to go to the same country لا ،لاةلودلا سفن ىلإ باهذلا يونأ  28 3 5 16 29.9% 52 
Yes, I plan to go to the same country (Please specify the country/countries 
 ةلودلا سفن ىلإ باهذلا يونأ ،معن)ةلودلا ديدحت ءاجر/لودلا   64 15 12 10 58.0% 101 
answered question 174 
skipped question 226 
 
What are the main reasons you want to emigrate? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟كيدل ةرجهلا بابسأ مهأ يه ام 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
To make a higher income ربآأ لخد بسكل 74 22 22 18 72.3% 136 
To send money home كيوذل لاومأ لاسرلإ 15 4 8 2 15.4% 29 
To get training and return ةدوعلا مث بيردتلل 37 10 9 10 35.1% 66 
To live outside Egypt رصم جراخ شيعلل 30 8 11 14 33.5% 63 
Bad living conditions in Egypt رصم يف ةشيعملا لاوحأ ءوسل 60 18 18 15 59.0% 111 
To join family already outside Egypt رصم جراخ نيدوجوملا لهلااب قاحلل 5 2 3 4 7.4% 14 
To escape from family pressures and troubles تلاكشم وأ ةيلئاع طوغض نم بورهلل 8 2 6 0 8.5% 16 
There are no job opportunities in Egypt رصم يف لمع صرف رفوت مدعل 30 8 10 9 30.3% 57 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ بابسأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  25 3 2 9 20.7% 39 
answered question 188 
skipped question 212 
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What draws you to your country of destination? (Check all that apply)  امقبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا ىلإ كبذجي يذلا  
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
I have friends there كانهءاقدصأ يدل 13 1 2 11 14.4% 27 
I have relatives there كانه براقأ يدل 31 5 3 8 25.1% 47 
I have a job offer there كانه لمع ضرع يدل 20 6 4 6 19.3% 36 
I want to live in that country ةلودلا هذه يف شيعأ نأ بحأ 59 16 15 17 57.2% 107 
More job opportunities there كانه رثآأ لمعلا صرف 60 12 12 14 52.4% 98 
My destination is less crowded and/or polluted اثولت وأ اماحدزإ لقأ يتهجو 43 17 14 15 47.6% 89 
I could study there كانه ةساردلا يننكمي 57 12 16 19 55.6% 104 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ بابسأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  10 3 2 5 10.7% 20 
answered question 187 
skipped question 213 
 
What is your source of information about your country of destination? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا نع كتامولعم ردصم وهام 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Friends/Relatives ءاقدصأ/براقأ  76 20 20 21 75.3% 137 
Internet تنرتنلإا 63 19 19 15 63.7% 116 
Egyptian Authorities ةيمسر ةيرصم رداصم 4 2 2 1 4.9% 9 
Personal Research يصخش ثحب 48 13 12 18 50.0% 91 
Media (TV/Radio/Newspapers  ملاعلإا)نويزفلت/ويدار/دئارج  35 8 11 10 35.2% 64 
Embassy of the Receiving Country ةدوصقملا ةلودلا ةرافس 13 4 0 2 10.4% 19 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ رداصم)ديدحتلا ءاجر  6 2 0 3 6.0% 11 
answered question 182 
skipped question 218 
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Are there persons who will help you migrate? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟ةرجهلل كدعاسيس نم كانه له 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University 
in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Relatives in your destination country اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا يف براقأ 30 9 2 9 33.3% 50 
Relatives in Egypt رصم يف براقأ 17 1 0 5 15.3% 23 
Egyptian Friends in your destination country اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا يف نييرصم ءاقدصأ 20 6 3 8 24.7% 37 
Non-Egyptian Friends in your destination country اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا يف نييرصم ريغ ءاقدصأ 8 1 1 3 8.7% 13 
Friends in Egypt رصم يف ءاقدصأ 11 3 1 3 12.0% 18 
Migration Brokers ةرجه ءاطسو 20 3 3 2 18.7% 28 
Other (Please specify  ىرخأ)ديدحتلا ءاجر  19 3 3 4 19.3% 29 
answered question 150 
skipped question 250 
 
 
 
What do you expect is the cost of migrating? ؟ةرجهلا ةفلكت نوكت نا عقوتت مآ 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Average 
Response 
Total 
Response 
Count 
Expected cost in LE يرصملا هينجلاب ةعقوتمملا ةفلكتلا 70 17 17 19 32,748.13 4,028,020 123 
answered question 123 
skipped question 277 
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Have you saved up money to use for your emigration? ؟ةرجهلل اهمادختسا دصقب لااومأ ترخدإ له  
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No لا 88 20 19 21 86.5% 148 
Yes (Please specify in LE  معن)يرصملا هينجلاب ديدحتلا ءاجر  14 2 2 5 13.5% 23 
answered question 171 
skipped question 229 
 
 
 
Are there others financially assisting you in your emigration? (Check all that apply) قبطني ام لآ رتخإ ؟ةرجهلل ايلام كدعاسي نم كانه له  
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, a member of my immediate family ةرشابملا يترسأ دارفأ نم درف ،معن 58 7 4 12 47.4% 81 
Yes, a member of my extended family ةعسوملا يترسأ دارفأ نم درف ،معن 9 2 0 0 6.4% 11 
Yes, friend/friends قيدص ،معن/يل ءاقدصأ  2 0 0 0 1.2% 2 
Yes, people from my neighborhood/village ةريجلا نم صاخشأ ،معن/ةيرقلا  1 0 0 0 0.6% 1 
No, no one is assiting me financially ايدام يندعاسي دحأ لا ،لا 41 11 17 14 48.5% 83 
If yes (Please specify in LE  معنب تبجأ اذا)يرصملا هينجلاب ديدحتلا ءاجر  11 
answered question 171 
skipped question 229 
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Do you intend to work as an engineer abroad, or will you accept a position in another industry? ؟ رخآ لاجم يف لمعلا لوبق كنكمي مأ ،جراخلاب سدنهمآ لمعلا يونت له 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Engineering positions only طقف ةيسدنه فئاظو 93 18 25 17 82.7% 153 
Any position abroad جراخلاب ةفيظو يأ 18 5 0 9 17.3% 32 
answered question 185 
skipped question 215 
 
 
 
If you intend to work as an engineer, have you already completed any necessary equivalence exams for your destination country?  له ،سدنهمآ لمعلا يونت تنآ نإ
؟اهدصقت يتلا ةلودلا يف ةبولطم ةلداعم تارابتخإ يأ تيرجأ 
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American 
University 
in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes, I have already completed the exams لعفلاب تارابتخلإا تلمآأ دقل ،معن 1 1 1 1 2.3% 4 
In progress يراج  اهب مايقلا 17 2 4 7 16.9% 30 
I will in the future فوس اقحلا اهيرجأ  67 11 17 10 59.3% 105 
No, I do not intend to يونأ لا ،لا 13 3 1 5 12.4% 22 
No, none are needed in my country of destination اهدصقأ يتلا ةلودلا يف ةبولطم تسيل ،لا 5 6 2 3 9.0% 16 
answered question 177 
skipped question 223 
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How willing would you be to migrate illegally if a legal path to migration is unavailable? ؟ةينوناق قرط كل رفوتت مل اذإ ةينوناق ريغ ةقيرطب ةرجهلل كدادعتسإ ىدم ام  
Answer Options Cairo University 
Ain 
Shams 
University 
Alexandria 
University 
American University 
in Cairo 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Will definitely resort to illegal measures if a legal way is not available 
ةينوناق قرط رفوتت مل اذإ ةينوناق ريغ لئاسو ىلإ ديآأتلاب أجلأ فوس 2 0 0 0 1.1% 2 
Very willing ادج دعتسم 5 0 0 0 2.7% 5 
Somewhat willing لا ضعب دعتسمءيش  3 2 2 0 3.7% 7 
Very Reluctant ادج ددرتم 3 2 0 0 2.7% 5 
Will not resort to illegal measures if a legal path is not available  أجلأ نل
ةينوناق قرط رفوتت مل اذإ ةينوناق ريغ لئاسو ىلإ 98 21 23 27 89.9% 169 
answered question 188 
skipped question 212 
 
